Tax Reform in Two-Sector General Equilibrium by Cardi, Olivier & Restout, Romain
Tax Reform in Two-Sector General Equilibrium
Olivier Cardi, Romain Restout
To cite this version:
Olivier Cardi, Romain Restout. Tax Reform in Two-Sector General Equilibrium. Working
Paper GATE 2008-29. 2008. <halshs-00333597>
HAL Id: halshs-00333597
https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00333597
Submitted on 23 Oct 2008
HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access
archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci-
entific research documents, whether they are pub-
lished or not. The documents may come from
teaching and research institutions in France or
abroad, or from public or private research centers.
L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est
destine´e au de´poˆt et a` la diffusion de documents
scientifiques de niveau recherche, publie´s ou non,
e´manant des e´tablissements d’enseignement et de
recherche franc¸ais ou e´trangers, des laboratoires
publics ou prive´s.
 
 
 
 
 
 
Groupe d’An
Éc
UMR 
 
 
 
DOCUMENTS DE TRAVAI
 
W.P. 0
  
Tax Reform in Two-Secto
 
 
Olivier Cardi, Ro
 
 
Octobre
 
GATE Groupe d’Analyse et
UMR 5824 d
93 chemin des Mouilles –
B.P. 167 – 69131
Tél. +33 (0)4 72 86 60 60 – 
Messagerie électroniqu
Serveur Web : ww
 
  
 
GATE 
alyse et de Théorie 
onomique 
5824 du CNRS L - WORKING PAPERS 
8-29 
r General Equilibrium 
main Restout  
 2008 
 de Théorie Économique 
u CNRS 
 69130 Écully – France 
 Écully Cedex 
Fax +33 (0)4 72 86 60 90 
e gate@gate.cnrs.fr
w.gate.cnrs.fr 
TAX REFORM IN TWO-SECTOR GENERAL
EQUILIBRIUM1
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Abstract
We use a two-sector open economy model with an imperfectly competitive non traded
sector to investigate the dynamic and steady-state effects of three tax reforms: [i] two
revenue-neutral tax reforms shifting the tax burden from labor to consumption taxes and
[ii] one labor tax reform keeping the marginal tax wedge constant. Regardless of its form,
a tax restructuring crowds-in consumption and investment and raises employment. While
tax multipliers for overall output are always positive, their size depends on the type of
the tax reform and the financing scheme. Interestingly, the trade balance plays a key
role in determining the relative size of sectoral tax multipliers: whereas the long-term tax
multiplier is always slightly higher in the traded sector than in the non traded sector,
this result is reversed in the short-term. Finally, time horizon matters in determining the
relationships between both overall and sectoral tax multipliers and labor responsiveness.
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1 Introduction
Can a tax restructuring have beneficial effects on overall economic performance? Surprisingly,
the dynamic general equilibrium literature offers little guidance on what kind of tax reform
strategy makers should employ to stimulate employment without depressing consumption and
raising the public debt burden, especially in open economy. However, the two last decade have
been witness of numerous episodes of fundamental tax reforms in European countries urged
to reduce public deficits and unemployment rates. Hence, we address this issue by developing
a novel and analytically tractable model model which can be viewed as a two-sector extension
of the open economy version of the Baxter and King [1993] dynamic general equilibrium
model.1 Since tax reforms take various forms, we consider three simple and practicable
tax restructuring: two revenue-neutral tax reforms that shift the tax burden from labor to
consumption taxes and [ii] one labor tax reform keeping the marginal tax wedge constant.2
We show formally that regardless of the type of the tax reform, a tax restructuring crowds-in
consumption and investment in the long-term (long-term), raises permanently employment
and leads to overall welfare gains.
Urged to reduce high levels of unemployment rates, industrialized countries are tempted to
cut labor tax to stimulate employment. However, the unavailability of debt financing restricts
the use of such tax policies in numerous OECD economies. In particular, the stability and
growth pact is aimed at achieving budget balance in EMU member countries over the medium
run. To compensate for the reduction in tax revenue, governments must find other source of
tax financing. Since raising lump-sum taxes is a difficult political task, a tax restructuring
that is revenue-neutral would be easier to implement. Building on that, a key policy question
for European countries is wether a shift of the labor tax burden to consumption tax could be a
useful tool for stimulating employment without increasing public debt. Additionally, the type
of a tax restructuring should rely upon current countries’ tax structure. Table 1 reports the
rate of consumption tax τ c, the employers’ part of labor taxes τF and the employees’ part of
labor taxes τH across thirteen OECD countries over the recent period (2000-2006).3 The most
striking feature is that both consumption and labor taxes vary considerably across countries
and thus there exists a room for a tax reform in several OECD economies. For instance, a
strategy which involves simultaneously cutting payroll taxes and raising the consumption tax
rate in France and Italy which reached upper bounds of τF , reducing labor income taxes and
increasing τ c in Belgium, or decreasing τF while raising τH in Spain.
Would a shift in the level or the composition of the tax wedge be of help in stimulating
employment and economic activity? While so far little attention has been paid to such issue,
several countries experienced or will experience (in particular East Transition Countries)
fundamental tax reforms. From 1986, Denmark gradually moves the tax burden from labor
income taxes to consumption taxes; over 1994-1999, Hungary reduces payroll taxes while
increasing the effective labor income tax rates; in 2005 Germany cut its payroll taxes while
increasing the standard consumption tax rate from 16% to 19% in 2007. This question has
triggered an intense debate in the European countries until recently, in particular in France
regarding the eventual adoption of the social VAT implemented in Germany.
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Table 1: Consumption and Labor Tax rates in 13 OECD countries
Countries τ c τF τH Countries τ c τF τH
Austria 0.18 0.16 0.32 Italy 0.14 0.27 0.28
Belgium 0.13 0.20 0.42 Japan 0.07 0.08 0.19
Denmark 0.26 0.00 0.42 Netherlands 0.18 0.09 0.33
Spain 0.14 0.22 0.20 Sweden 0.20 0.23 0.31
Finland 0.23 0.23 0.32 UK 0.15 0.07 0.26
France 0.16 0.27 0.29 US 0.05 0.06 0.25
Germany 0.15 0.15 0.44 Average 0.16 0.16 0.31
Notes: τc: consumption tax rate, τF : employers’ part of labor taxes, and
τH : employees’ part of labor taxes. Source: OECD. Data coverage: 2000-
2007
There has been recently a growing interest for tax policy, as exemplified by Leeper and
Yang [2008], Mankiw and Weinzierl [2006], Trabandt and Uhlig [2006], who consider a closed-
economy model. Instead, Ganelli and Tervala [2008], Lin [1999], Mendoza and Tesar [1998]
investigate the implications of a tax reform in an open-economy framework. One major
contribution of our paper is to cover both the closed- and open-economy dimensions of con-
temporaneous industrialized countries by considering both non tradables and tradables. The
relevance of the distinction between a non traded sector and a traded sector is supported
by the data as shown in Table 2. More specifically, empirical evidence reveal that in OECD
countries, the non tradable share in overall GDP and total employment averages to 65% and
about 60% in total investment expenditure. A second interesting feature is that the response
of a two-sector economy to a shock depends heavily on relative sectoral capital intensities.
However the two-sector theoretical literature (see e. g. Coto-Martinez and Dixon [2003], Ob-
stfeld [1989]) commonly assumes that the traded sector is more capital intensive for analytical
convenience. Our estimation of sectoral output shares of capital income shows that the non
traded sector is relatively more capital intensive in 6 of 13 industrialized countries.4 Hence,
we consider the two cases both analytically and numerically. A third key feature is that
our estimation of the markup at a sectoral level shows that the non traded sector displays
a large market power. This has been introduced by assuming that the non traded sector is
imperfectly competitive.
What are the main economic lessons drawn from our two-sector general equilibrium model?
One virtue of the model we developed is that it allows to express the steady-state changes of
a tax restructuring as a scaled-down version of long-term effects of a labor tax cut financed
by a fall in lump-sum transfers. This enables us to find analytically that regardless of the
type of the tax reform, a tax restructuring crowds-in consumption and investment in the
long-term, raises permanently employment and thereby boosts overall GDP. To estimate the
effectiveness of a tax reform, we calculated both analytically and numerically the long-term
and short-term tax multipliers and evaluated the size of overall welfare gains. We find that the
tax multipliers for overall output are always positive and agents’ overall welfare rises for the
benchmark parametrization. Interestingly, adjustments of both investment and trade balance
play a key role in determining the effectiveness of a tax restructuring. As the trade balance
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Table 2: Sectoral Capital Intensities, Markups and Non-Tradable Share
θT θN µN µT Y N/Y LN/L IN/I
France 0.27 0.30 1.42 1.22 0.69 0.64 0.63
Germany 0.22 0.35 1.55 1.17 0.64 0.61 0.61
Italy 0.22 0.33 1.73 1.24 0.63 0.56 0.54
Japan 0.42 0.39 1.63 1.28 0.64 0.61 0.59
US 0.36 0.32 1.42 1.24 0.68 0.72 0.59
Average (13) 0.32 0.32 1.48 1.23 0.65 0.64 0.59
ktraded > knontraded (6) 0.37 0.31 1.44 1.26 0.64 0.64 0.60
knontraded > ktraded (5) 0.28 0.33 1.51 1.21 0.66 0.63 0.57
Notes: θT (θN respectively): output share of capital income in the traded (non
traded respectively) sector. µT and µN are the markups charged in the traded
and non traded sector. Y N/Y , LN/L and IN/I are the non tradable share
in overall GDP, total employment and investment expenditures respectively.
Source: OECD, EU KLEMS. Data coverage: 1970-2004.
enters on deficit on impact, the short-term tax multiplier which falls in the range 0.03-0.14 is
always smaller than the long-term tax multiplier which comprises between 0.05 and 0.25. More
interestingly, time horizon matters in determining the size of sectoral expansionary effects.
Whereas its share in overall output is about 1/3 in industrialized countries, the boom in the
traded sector in the long-term amounts for half of GDP increase. Unlike, in the short-term,
output in the traded sector drops dramatically while the non traded sector expands sizeably.
One important contribution of our formal study is to highlight the roles of two critical
parameters in determining the size of the tax multiplier: the elasticity of labor supply and
the degree of tax progressiveness. Hence, we conducted a sensitivity analysis with respect
to these to parameters. First, like Baxter and King [1993], we find that the long-term tax
multiplier for overall output rises monotonically with labor responsiveness. Unlike, the short-
term tax multiplier decreases as long as the elasticity labor supply exceeds unity since the
depressing effect on the domestic demand induced by the higher consumption price index
predominates over the stimulating effect originating from the standard wealth effect. We get
a more complete picture by conducting the sensitivity analysis at a sectoral level. We find
that the short-term sectoral tax multiplier in the non traded sector rises and in the traded
sector falls as labor supply gets more responsive since investment is crowded-in further by
the tax reform. Finally, the long-term tax multiplier falls or rises with the degree of tax
progressiveness depending on wether the tax restructuring keeps the tax revenue or the tax
wedge constant since in the latter case, the depressing effect induced by the rise in the labor
income tax gets smaller as the tax scheme gets more progressive.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines the specification of a two-sector
model where the traded good is produced by a perfectly competitive sector and the non
traded good is produced by an imperfectly competitive sector. In sections 3 and 4, we discuss
the steady-state and the dynamic effects of three tax restructuring. Section 3 focuses on tax
rate changes when lump-sum transfers are used to balance the government budget. Section
4 analyzes the implications of alternative revenue-neutral tax restructuring scenarios. In
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section 5, we conduct a sensitivity analysis at an overall and a sectoral level with respect to
key parameters. Section 6 concludes.
2 The Framework
Consider a small open economy that is populated by a constant number of identical households
and firms that have perfect foresight and live forever. The country is small in world goods
and capital markets and faces given world interest rate, r?. A perfectly competitive sector
produces a traded good denoted by the superscript T that can be exported and consumed
domestically. An imperfectly competitive sector produces a non traded good denoted by the
superscript N which is devoted to physical capital accumulation and domestic consumption.
Finally, the traded good is chosen as numeraire.
2.1 Households
At each instant the representative agent consumes traded goods and non traded goods denoted
respectively by cT and cN . We assume that there is a continuum of commodities indexed by
the subscript j ∈ [0, n] and denoted by cN (j), each produced by a different firm. Consumption
of non traded commodity j is aggregated by the means of the following formulation:5
cN = n
1
1−σ
[∫ n
0
cN (j)
σ−1
σ
] σ
σ−1
, σ > 1, (1)
where the size of the parameter σ reflects the ease with which any varieties can be substituted
for each other. Denoting by p the unit cost of the non traded composite good and using cost-
minimizing, the demand for variety j of the non traded consumption good can be written as
follows:
cN (j) =
1
n
(
%(j)
p
)−σ
cN , p = n−
1
1−σ
[∫ n
0
%(j)1−σ
] 1
1−σ
, (2)
where cN represents the composite non traded consumption good.
The agent is endowed with a unit of time and supplies a fraction L(t) as labor and the
remainder, l ≡ 1−L is consumed as leisure. At any instant of time, households derive utility
from their consumption and leisure (and thus a disutility from labor supply). The traded and
the non traded good are aggregated by a constant elasticity of substitution function:
c
(
cT , cN
)
=
[
ϕ
1
φ
(
cT
)φ−1
φ + (1− ϕ) 1φ (cN)φ−1φ ] φφ−1 , (3)
with ϕ the weight attached to the traded good in the overall consumption bundle (0 < ϕ < 1)
and φ the intratemporal elasticity of substitution (φ > 0).
The representative household maximizes a lifetime utility function:
U =
∫ ∞
0
{
u
[
c
(
cT (t), cN (t)
)]
+ v(L)
}
e−βtdt, (4)
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where β is the consumer’s discount rate. For analytical simplicity, instantaneous utility func-
tion ξ ≡ u(c) + v(L) is assumed to be separable in consumption and labor and to take an
iso-elastic form:
ξ ≡ 1
1− 1σc
c1−
1
σc − γ 1
1 + 1σL
L
1+ 1
σL , (5)
where σL > 0 is the Frisch elasticity of labor supply (or intertemporal elasticity of substitution
for labor supply); γ > 0 is a simple scaling factor which parametrizes the magnitude of
disutility from working.6
Households supply L(t) units of labor services and hold the physical capital stock for which
they receive the capital rental rate. In addition, they accumulate internationally traded bonds
holding, b(t), that yields net interest rate earnings r?b(t), expressed in terms of the traded
good. Denoting by wAL the after-tax labor income and lump-sum transfers from the State
by Z, the flow budget constraint writes as follows:
b˙(t) = r?b(t) +
(
rK + δK
)
K(t) + wAL(t)− pc (p(t)) (1 + τ c) c(t)− p(t)I(t) + Z. (6)
The flow budget constraint states that households receive the gross real wage w and pay a
labor income tax τH above a certain threshold denoted by κ. Thus, wA = w − (w − κ) τH
corresponds to the after-tax “average” wage and wH = w
(
1− τH) denotes the after-tax
“marginal” wage. As longer as tax allowances are positive, the tax system is progressive
which means that the average tax burden rises with the wage rate. Households devote their
financial and non financial wealth to expenditure in consumption and investment goods.
Total expenditure in consumption goods is equal to pc (1 + τ c) c with τ c the consumption
tax rate and pc the consumption price index. Households accumulate pI with p the relative
price of the non traded good in terms of the traded good. We assume that I is defined
analogously (all investment consists in non traded goods) to cN with the same elasticity of
substitution σ:
I = n
1
1−σ
[∫ n
0
ι(j)
σ−1
σ
] σ
σ−1
, σ > 1, (7)
Adopting a similar cost-minimizing procedure than we used for consumption, households’
demand for variety j of the investment good is thus given by:
i(j) =
1
n
(
%(j)
p
)−σ
I. (8)
Since cN and I feature the same function formal (i. e. an identical elasticity of demand), the
price index for investment good is given by p (see (2)). Aggregate investment gives rise to
overall capital accumulation according to the following dynamic equation:
K˙(t) = I(t)− δKK(t). (9)
where we assume that physical capital depreciates at rate δK .
Since c (.) is homothetic, the household’s maximization problem can be decomposed into
two stages. In the first stage, consumers choose their real consumption, c, labor supply L,
and the rates of accumulation of traded bonds together with domestic capital to maximize (4)
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subject to the flow budget constraint (6) and initial conditions b(0) = b0 and K(0) = K0. At
the second stage, the cost-minimizing intratemporal allocation between non traded and traded
goods follows immediately from the Shephard’s Lemma: pcN = αcpcc and cT = (1− αc) pcc,
with αc the share of non traded goods in consumption expenditure.
2.2 Firms
Both sectors use physical capital, KT and KN , and labor, LT and LN , according to a constant
returns to scale production function, Y T = F
(
KT , LT
)
and Y N = H
(
KN , LN
)
, which
are assumed to have the usual neoclassical properties of positive and diminishing marginal
products. The traded and non traded sectors face two cost components: a capital rental cost
equal to rK + δK , and a labor cost equal to wF = w
(
1 + τF
)
with τF denotes the payroll tax
rate (i. e the employer’s part of labor taxes).
The first order conditions derived from profit-maximization in the traded sector state that
capital marginal product is equal to capital rental rate, i. e. FK = rK + δK , and labor
marginal product equalizes labor cost, i. e. FL = wF . Firm j in the non traded sector
produces a level of output ZN (j) = Y N (j) − FC(j) with Y N (j) = H (KN (j),LN (j)) and
FC(j) > 0 is a fixed cost. Each firm j chooses capital and labor to maximize profits subject
to the demand for each brand originating from the private cN (j) + ι(j) and the public sector
gN (j), taking the price index p for the composite consumption good and input prices as given:
%(j)H
(KN (j),LN (j))− (rK + δK)KN (j)− wFLN (j)− %(j)FC(j),
subject to Y N (j) = cN (j) + ι(j) + gN (j), (10)
which assumes that labor is perfectly mobile across firms so that all firms are constrained to
pay the same wage wF . This choice problem for firm j yields the conditions that the marginal
revenue of capital %(j)HKµ and labor
%(j)HL
µ equalizes the capital rental rate r
K + δK and the
producer wage wF . The marginal product of each input is lowered by the (constant) markup
µ(= µN ) which defined as follows:
µ ≡ σ
σ − 1 , (11)
with σ > 1 the elasticity of demand facing firm j. Since commodities are differentiated,
each firm has market power and is able to set a price over the marginal cost. In this paper,
we further assume that free entry drives profits down to zero, i. e. %(j)H
(KN (j),LN (j)) −
rKKN (j) − wFLN (j) − %(j)FC(j) = 0 for all j. In a free entry equilibrium, a proportion 1σ
of total revenue will cover fixed cost (since 1− 1σ always covers variable cost).
We should focus on a symmetric equilibrium where all non competitive firms will produce
the same output and will charge the same price %(j) = % = p. Under symmetry, aggregate
consumption and investment in the non traded good are cN = ncN and I = nι. In addition,
we have the resource constraints LT + LN = L with LN = nLN and KT + KN = K with
KN = nKN . With free-entry, the zero-profit condition determines the number of firms which
is given by nFC = (µ− 1)ZN , using the fact that ZN = Y N/µ.7
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2.3 Government
The final agent in the economy is the government who finances lump-sum transfers to house-
holds Z together with public spending falling on the traded gT and the non traded good pgN
by raising taxes on consumption, τ cpcc, labor,
[
τH (w − κ) + τFw] according to the following
balanced condition:
τ cpcc+
[
τH (w − κ) + τFw]L = Z + gT + pgN , (12)
where labor taxes can be rewritten as
(
wF − wA)L. Similar to consumption, government
spending in the composite non traded good gN is defined analogously to cN and I.
2.4 Macroeconomic Equilibrium and Equilibrium Dynamics
Denoting by ki ≡ Ki/Li the capital-labor ratio for sector i = T,N , we express the production
functions in intensive form, that is yT = f
(
kT
) ≡ F (KT , LT ) /LT and yN = h (kN) ≡
H
(
KN , LN
)
/LN , where small letters mean that the variable is expressed in terms of the
sector specific labor.
To obtain the macroeconomic equilibrium, we first derive the optimality conditions for
households and firms and then combine these with the inputs allocation constraints and
accumulation equations. The macroeconomic equilibrium is summarized by the following set
of equations:
uc (c) = pc (p) (1 + τ c)λ, (13a)
vL (L) = −λwA, (13b)
fk
(
kT
)
=
p
η
hk
(
kN
) ≡ rK + δK , (13c)[
f
(
kT
)− kT fk (kT )] = p
η
[
h
(
kN
)− kNhk (kN)] ≡ w (1 + τF ) , (13d)
LTkT + LNkN = K, (13e)
LT + LN = L, (13f)
λ˙ = λ (β − r?) , (13g)
rK
p
+
p˙
p
= r?, (13h)
1
µ
Y N = cN + I + gN , (13i)
b˙ = r?b(t) + Y T − cT − gT , (13j)
and dynamic equation (9) and the transversality conditions:
lim
t→∞ p(t)K(t)e
−r?t = lim
t→∞ b(t)e
−r?t = 0. (14)
λ is the co-state variables associated with dynamic equation (6). We require the time prefer-
ence rate to be equal to the world interest rate:
β = r?, (15)
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in order to generate an interior solution. This standard assumption made in the literature
implies that the marginal utility of wealth, λ, must remain constant over time, i. e. λ = λ¯
(see e. g. Cardi [2007] on that subject). This gives rise to the zero-root property which has
the appealing feature to allow for splitting the steady-state changes into a wealth effect and
a tax effect.
Static efficiency conditions (13a) and (13b) can be solved for real consumption and labor
which of course must hold at any point of time:
c = c
(
λ¯, p, τ c
)
, L = L
(
λ¯, p, τF , τH
)
, (16)
with cλ¯ < 0, cp < 0, cτc < 0, Lλ¯ > 0; additionally, LτF < 0, LτH < 0, and Lp ≶ 0 according
to wether kN ≷ kT . A rise in agent’s wealth (i. e. a fall in the marginal utility of wealth λ¯)
stimulates consumption while discouraging labor supply. A rise in the relative price of non
tradables p reduces real consumption. An increase in p decreases or increases the wage rate
w and thereby lowers or raises labor supply according to wether kN ≷ kT . While a rise in
the consumption tax rate τ c depresses consumption by raising its marginal cost, a fall in the
labor income tax rate levied on employers τF or employees τH stimulates labor supply by
raising the after-tax labor income.
Static efficiency conditions (13c)-(13d) state sectoral marginal revenue products must
equalize to the labor producer cost wF and capital rental rate rK + δK . They can be solved
for sector capital intensities ratios:
kT = kT (p) , kN = kN (p) , (17)
where the signs of other partial derivatives are dependent upon relative sectoral capital in-
tensities: kTp ≶ 0, kNp ≶ 0 according to wether kN ≷ kT . Substituting (17) into the resource
constraints for capital and labor (13e)-(13f), we obtain the static solutions for traded and the
non traded labor; then we solve for the traded and the non traded output:8
Y T = Y T
(
K, p, λ¯, τF , τH
)
, Y N = Y N
(
K, p, λ¯, τF , τH
)
, (18)
where Y TK ≶ 0, Y Tλ¯ ≷ 0, Y
N
K ≷ 0, Y Nλ¯ ≶ 0, Y
T
τ j
≶ 0 and Y N
τ j
≷ 0 (with j = H,F ) depending
on wether kN ≷ kT , together with Y Tp < 0 and Y Np > 0. A rise in aggregate capital stock K
induces a shift of labor in the direction of the more capital-intensive sector. A rise in total
employment triggered by a rise in λ¯ or a labor tax cut τ j (j = F,H) shifts labor in favor of
the most labor-intensive sector. An appreciation in the real exchange rate attracts resources
from the traded to the non traded sector.
The transitional adjustment of the two-sector economy is driven by three equations
(13h),(13i) and (13j). The two dynamic equations (13h)-(13i) form a separate subsystem
in p and K. The capital accumulation equation (13i) which states that investment must
eliminate an eventual excess demand or excess supply in the non traded good market. The
dynamic equation for the real exchange rate (13h) adjusts to equalize the returns on domestic
capital, i. e. r
K
p +
p˙
p =
hk
µ − δK + p˙p , and foreign assets r?. Since the system features one state
variable, K, and one jump variable, p, the equilibrium yields a unique one-dimensional stable
8
saddle-path, irrespective of the relative sizes of capital-labor ratios. Starting from an initial
aggregate capital stock K(0) = K0, the stable dynamic time paths followed by K and p write
as follows:
K(t) = K˜ +
(
K0 − K˜
)
eν1t, p(t) = p˜+ ω12
(
K(t)− K˜
)
, (19)
where ω12 < 0 is the eigenvector associated with the stable eigenvalue ν1 < 0 and we normalized
the eigenvector ω11 to unity.
Equation (13j) states that the current account surplus, which comprises the trade balance,
must be equal to the value of output less absorption (cT + gT ), plus interest payments on
outstanding assets.9 Substituting first the ST solutions (16) and (18), then linearizing the
dynamic equation of the internationally traded bonds (13j) in the neighborhood of the steady-
state, substituting the solutions for K(t) and p(t) and finally invoking the transversality
condition, one obtain the linearized version of the nation’s intertemporal budget constraint:(
b0 − b˜
)
= Φ1
(
K0 − K˜
)
(20)
where the initial stocks K0 and b0 are given. The stable solution for b(t) consistent with LT
solvency writes as follows: (
b(t)− b˜
)
= Φ1
(
K(t)− K˜
)
, (21)
where Φ1 describes the instantaneous effect of capital accumulation on the current account.
As emphasized by Turnovsky and Sen [1995], a striking feature of the transitional adjust-
ment of the economy is its dependency upon the relative capital intensities of sectors T and
N . If kT > kN , we have ω12 = 0 and Φ1 = −p˜ < 0. Thus, the real exchange rate dynamics
degenerate, savings is unaffected and current account mirrors capital investment flow. Unlike,
with the reversal of capital intensities, ω12 < 0 and Φ1 < 0.
10 Along the transitional path,
overall capital stock and the relative price of non tradables move in opposite direction.11
2.5 Steady-State
Substituting first the ST static solutions (16), (17) and (18), the steady-state of the economy
is obtained by setting K˙, p˙, b˙ = 0 and is defined by the following set of equations:
hk
[
kN (p˜)
]
µ
− δK = r?, (22a)
1
µ
Y N
(
K˜, p˜, λ¯, τF , τH
)
− cN (λ¯, p˜, τ c)− δKK˜ − gN = 0, (22b)
r?b˜+ Y T
(
K˜, p˜, λ¯, τF , τH
)
− cT (λ¯, p˜, τ c)− gT = 0, (22c)
and the intertemporal solvency condition(
b0 − b˜
)
= Φ
(
K0 − K˜
)
, (22d)
The steady-state equilibrium composed by these four equations jointly determine p˜, K˜, b˜ and
λ¯.
9
Equation (22a) asserts the rate of return on domestic capital income is equal to the exoge-
nous world interest rate, r?. Since the world interest rate is fixed, this equality determines the
steady-state values of p which thereby is unaffected by a tax restructuring. Equation (22b)
restates that the production of non traded goods net of fixed cost must be exactly outweighed
by a demand counterpart. The market clearing condition at the steady-state determines the
LT level of the capital stock for given marginal utility of wealth. This LT capital stock re-
quires that an amount δKK˜ be invested. Equation (22c) implies that in the steady-state
equilibrium, the current account must be zero which means that interest receipts from foreign
assets holding, i. e. r?b˜, must be equal to net exports denoted by n˜x with nx = Y T −cT −gT .
System (22) may be solved for the steady-state values by applying a two-step procedure.
We first solve equations (22a) to (22c) as functions of the marginal utility of wealth, λ¯, and
tax parameters, τ c, τF and τH :12
K˜ = K
(
λ¯, τF , τH , τ c
)
, b˜ = v
(
λ¯, τF , τH , τ c
)
, (23a)
with Kλ¯ > 0, Kτc ≶ 0 depending on wether kN ≷ kT , KτH < 0, KτF < 0, vλ¯ < 0, vτc < 0,
vτF > 0, and vτH > 0.13
The signs of partial derivatives of steady-state functions merit comments. An increase in
the marginal utility of wealth, reflecting the wealth effect, induces agents to reduce their real
consumption and raise labor supply. In the case kN > kT (resp. kT > kN ), an excess demand
(resp. supply) arises in the non traded good market which requires a higher capital stock for
the non traded goods market-clearing condition to hold. For the current account to be zero
in the LT, higher exports must be exactly matched by lower net interest receipts from traded
bonds holding.
A rise of consumption tax τ c or τ j (j = F,H) reflects the tax effect which influences the
consumption and labor supply of households. If kN > kT (resp. kT > kN ), an increase in
τ c depresses demand for non tradables which in turn calls for capital decumulation (accu-
mulation). Regardless of sectoral capital-labor ratios, since the capital adjustment raises the
output of the traded sector and the rise in τ c reduces the domestic demand for that good,
the trade balance improves which in turn requires a LT fall in b. A cut in the labor tax τ j
(j = F,H) lowers the after-tax labor income wA which induces agents to supply more labor.
If kN > kT (resp. kT > kN ), the rise in employment depresses (stimulates) the production of
non traded goods. The excess demand (resp. supply) in the non traded good market which
is eliminated by the rise in the capital stock. Regardless of sectoral capital intensities, the
accumulation of physical capital leads to a decumulation of foreign bonds.
3 Lump-Sum Transfer Financing and Tax Rate Changes
Since we explore tax reform strategies which require simultaneous changes of two tax rates
in section 4, we found convenient to discuss briefly the steady-state effects of a labor tax cut
and a rise in the consumption tax rate separately, for pedagogical purpose. Qualitative and
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quantitative responses of main macroeconomic variables are reported in Table 3. Note that
the change of tax rate are financed by a change in lump-sum transfers.
Table 3: Steady-State Effects of a Rise in Consumption Tax and a Fall in Payroll Tax
Model Numerical
kT > kN kN > kT
dτ c > 0 dτ j < 0 dτ c > 0 dτF < 0 dτH < 0 dτ c > 0 dτF < 0 dτH < 0
c − + -0.98 0.96 1.11 -0.96 0.89 1.29
L − + -0.89 0.87 1.01 -0.86 0.80 1.15
K − + -0.93 0.91 1.05 -0.82 0.76 1.10
b + − 5.08 -4.95 -5.73 3.41 -3.18 -4.58
Y − + -0.91 0.88 1.02 -0.85 0.79 1.13
Notes: All steady-state effects are reported as percentage changes relative to the initial steady-state
after the consumption tax rise (dτc = +0.03) and income tax cuts (dτF and dτH = −0.03).
Benchmark Parametrization
The model is calibrated for a plausible set of utility and production parameters in order
to be consistent with data of OECD countries (see Table 4 for a summary). The production
functions are supposed to take a Cobb-Douglas form:
f
(
kT
)
=
(
kT
)θT
, 0 < θT < 1, h
(
kN
)
=
(
kN
)θN
, 0 < θN < 1, (24)
where θT and θN represent the output share of capital income in the traded and non traded
sector respectively.
We first briefly discuss the calibration. Based on empirical estimates provided by Cashin
and McDermott [2003], we set the intertemporal elasticity of substitution σc to 0.7 and the
intratemporal elasticity of substitution φ to 2 implying that traded and non traded goods
are substitutes in consumption (i. e. cTp > 0). Following Stockman and Tesar [1995], the
parameter ϕ is assigned so as the the non tradable content in total consumption expenditure
denoted by αc falls in the range 40-60%. Hence, ϕ is set to 0.5. A critical parameter is
the elasticity of labor supply. Kimball and Shapiro [2003] provide an extensive discussion on
empirical estimates of the compensated elasticity of labor supply. While empirical studies
based on micro data find low values, say broadly lower than 0.5, the real business cycle
literature often set higher values for σL, say broadly equal or higher than unity. In our
benchmark parametrization, we choose an average value and set σL to 0.75. The world
interest rate, which is constrained to equalize the subjective time discount rate δ, is chosen
to be 4%. The rate of depreciation of capital is set to 6%.
We calculate the output shares of capital income, the markup, the tax rates, and tax
allowances, which are summarized in Table 4. The markup has been estimated by using the
consistent methodology by Roeger [1995]; µ is set to 1.43 if kT > kN and 1.49 if kN > kT ,
in line with empirical evidence; we calculated the effective tax rates on consumption and
labor by using OECD database. Since the adjustment of a two-sector country depends on the
relative sectoral capital intensities, we consider two different scenarios ; in the first scenario,
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Table 4: Benchmark parameter values
Parameter Value Definition
kT > kN kN > kT
σc 0.70 0.70 Intertemporal elasticity of substitution
σL 0.75 0.75 Frisch elasticity of labor supply
γ 0.90 0.90 Scaling parameter in labor disutility function
ϕ 0.50 0.50 Share of traded goods in consumer’s bundle
φ 2.00 2.00 Intratemporal elasticity of substitution
β 0.04 0.04 Subjective time discount rate
δK 0.06 0.06 Rate of physical capital depreciation
θT 0.37 0.28 Capital share in the Traded sector
θN 0.31 0.33 Capital share in the Non Traded sector
µ 1.43 1.49 Markup charged by the non traded sector
τ c 0.135 0.175 Consumption tax rate
τF 0.125 0.184 Employer’s payroll tax rate
τH 0.257 0.354 Employee’s wage tax rate
κ 0.20 0.15 Tax allowance
the traded sector is more capital intensive than the non traded sector (θT > θN ); in the second
scenario, the non traded sector is more capital intensive than the traded sector (θN > θT ).
A Labor Tax Cut
As understated in Picard and Toulemonde [2003], in perfectly competitive markets, it
does not matter to after-tax wage income and employment whether labor taxes are levied
on employers or employees. A fall in the labor tax τ j (j = F,H) induces agents to supply
more labor. As after-tax labor income increases, individuals are induced to raise their real
expenditure. An excess demand arises in the non traded good market which leads to an
investment boom and a current account deficit. While the rising after-tax labor income
lowers unambiguously λ¯ as long as kT > kN , the real exchange rate appreciation originating
from the excess demand in the non traded goods market moderates the fall in λ¯ by reducing
the real wage and thus labor supply with the reversal of capital intensities.
A Rise in Consumption Tax
A rise in τ c raises the marginal cost of consumption which in turn induces agents to
reduce their real expenditure. An excess supply arises in the non traded good market which
in turn requires a LT fall (resp. rise) in the capital stock if kN > kT (resp. kT > kN ).
The decumulation of physical capital induces a LT rise in traded bonds holding. Since the
government returns the net tax receipts to agents in a lump-sum transfer dZ > 0, households
get richer such that λ¯ falls. As long as kN > kT , a secondary channel plays by modifying
the relative price of non tradables. The excess supply in the non traded good market induces
an immediate depreciation in p which in turn stimulates consumption and labor supply by
reducing pc and raising w respectively. Since the latter effect predominates, λ¯ decreases
further.
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To conclude, numerical results reported in Table 3 show that LT effects are almost similar
across all 6 scenarios. Households lower or raise real consumption and labor supply by about
1% depending on wether the government raises the consumption tax rate by 3% or cuts the
labor tax by the same amount. A rise in τ c crowds-out capital accumulation and depresses
output by less than 1%. Unlike, a labor tax cut stimulates investment and overall output.
4 Three Tax Reform strategies
Since countries differ markedly in their tax structure, we consider three types of tax restruc-
turing. More specifically, we explore two revenue-neutral tax reforms which involve simulta-
neously either cutting payroll taxes by dτF < 0 or cutting labor income taxes by dτH < 0
and raising the consumption tax rate by dτ c > 0. While the two previous tax reforms cause
a fall in the marginal tax wedge, we study a third tax reform which involves simultaneously
cutting payroll taxes by dτF < 0 and raising labor income taxes by dτH > 0 so as to leave
the marginal tax wedge, denoted by τM , constant.
4.1 Long-Terms Effects of Revenue-Neutral Tax Reforms
To avoid confusion, we denote by
∣∣j,c the effects of a fall in the labor tax by dτ j < 0 (j =
F,H) coordinated with a rise in the consumption tax rate by dτ c
∣∣j,c which is endogenously
determined so as the government budget constraint is met.
The Endogenous Rise in τ c
Suppose that the policy maker wishes to replace the labor tax with a consumption tax,
keeping the budget constraint balanced. For unchanged labor supply and consumption deci-
sions, the labor tax cut (resp. increase in the consumption tax) leads to a fall (resp. a rise) in
tax revenue commonly labelled the tax rate effect. In addition, a change of a distorsionary tax
modifies the behavior of households. This induces a tax base effect which works in opposite
direction of the tax rate effect on public revenue. Since the consumption tax rate is treated as
an endogenous variable, the labor tax reform strategy requires a change of τ c by an amount
given by:
dτ c
∣∣j,c = −χj
χc
dτ j = −
τ
cpc
dc˜
dτ j +
(
w˜F − w˜A) dL˜dτ j + Γj
τ cpc
dc˜
dτc + (w˜
F − w˜A) dL˜dτc + Γc
dτ j > 0, (25)
where we used (12) and χc > 0 and χj ≷ 0. We denoted by Γj (j = F,H) and Γc the labor
and the consumption tax rate effects:
ΓF =
1− τH
1 + τF
w˜L˜, ΓH = (w − κ) L˜, Γc = pcc˜. (26)
The terms χj and χc capture two conflictory effects induced by a reduction of the labor tax
rate and an increase in the consumption tax rate respectively on public revenue. For given
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levels of real consumption and employment, a change of the tax rate modifies tax earnings as
it is reflected by Γj and Γc (see the third terms on the RHS of (25)). However, as shown by
the two first terms of the numerator and the denominator on the RHS of (25), the resulting
LT adjustment of employment and consumption moderate the labor and the consumption tax
rate effects. For the benchmark parametrization, χc and χj are positive which reflects the
fact that influence of the tax rate effect on tax revenue more than that offsets the impact of
the tax base effect.14 Consequently, τ c must rise to compensate the tax revenue loss induced
by the labor tax cut.
To have a sense of the magnitude of the labor and consumption tax base effect which
counteract the tax rate effects, we estimated the following ratios:
χj
Γj
' 0.68− 0.79 and χ
c
Γc
' 0.81− 0.85 and Γ
H
Γc
' 0.77, Γ
F
Γc
' 0.52− 0.64,
depending on wether case kN ≷ kT . These ratios show to what extent does a tax cut pay for
itself. For example, the numerical values of χ
j
Γj
and χ
c
Γc which are approximately 0.72 and 0.83
respectively show that a fall by 1% of public revenue induced by a labor tax rate shrinks to
0.72% due to the labor tax base effect (i. e. the resulting LT increases in consumption and
labor) and a rise in 1% in public revenue induced by the increase in the consumption tax rate
shrinks to 0.83% due to the consumption tax base effect (i. e. the resulting LT decreases in
consumption and labor).
The magnitude of the rise in τ c can be spilt into two components: the extent to which
the tax base effects compensate the tax rate effects and the ratio labor tax base-consumption
tax base, i. e.
χj
Γj
χc
Γc
Γj
Γc . While the first component plays a minor role, the ratio
ΓF
Γc is primarily
responsible of dτ c
∣∣j,c. The second component is approximately equal to 0.58 which means
that the labor tax base is about two-times smaller than the consumption tax base. Hence, a
labor tax cut by 1 percentage point requires a rise in τ c which is in average approximately
halfway of the labor tax cut.
Steady-State Changes
We now analyze the overall effects of a shift of the tax burden from labor taxes to con-
sumption taxes. After some manipulations, the LT change of x following a shift in the tax
burden is given by:15
dx˜
∣∣j,c = dx˜
dτ j
dτ j +
dx˜
dτ c
dτ c
∣∣j,c ≡ Φj,c dx˜
dτ j
dτ j > 0, (27)
where Φj,c =
[
1− w˜AL˜pc(1+τc)c˜
]
for j = F,H. A sufficient condition for Φj,c to be positive but
smaller than unity is that households are net creditor, i. e. a˜ > 0.16 The overall outcome a
tax restructuring is equal to the sum of the LT rise in x after a labor tax cut by dτ j < 0 and
the steady-state fall in x following a rise in by dτ c
∣∣j,c > 0. Interestingly, according to (27),
the steady-state change of x following a tax restructuring is a scaled-down version of the LT
changes of x = c, L,K after a fall in the labor tax τ j (j = F,H) financed by lump-sum taxes.
The larger the share of financial wealth in real disposable income, the larger the consumption
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tax base in comparison to the labor tax base, and thereby the less τ c must increase for a
given labor tax cut so as the government budget constraint to be met. Consequently, the
tax restructuring gets more effective as the scaled-down term Φj,c gets closer to unity. This
result stems from the fact that in the neoclassical model, a reduction of labor taxes financed
by a rise in a distorsionary tax have smaller effects than a tax cut financed by lump-sump tax
financing. For our benchmark parametrization, the scaled-down Φj,c falls in a range between
0.36 and 0.51 depending on wether kT ≷ kN ; additionally, Φj,c gets closer to unity as the
consumption tax base gets larger compared to the labor tax base. Since the steady-state
change of x following a tax restructuring is a scaled-down version of the LT effect after a cut
in τ j financed by a rise in lump-sum taxes, a second condition for a steady-state increase in
x is that dx/τ j > 0.
Table 5: Quantitative Effects of Three Tax Reforms
kT > kN kN > kT
Tax Reform dτF dτH dτF dτF dτH dτF
Financed by dτ c dτ c dτH dτ c dτ c dτH
A.Tax rates changes
dτ˜ c 1.8 2.1 1.3 1.9
dτ˜F -3.0 -3.0 -3.0 -3.0
dτ˜H -3.0 2.0 -3.0 1.6
B.Long-Term
dY˜ 0.32 0.37 0.19 0.40 0.58 0.15
dL˜ 0.31 0.36 0.18 0.41 0.59 0.15
dc˜ 0.34 0.40 0.20 0.46 0.66 0.17
dK˜ 0.33 0.38 0.19 0.39 0.56 0.14
C.Short-Term
dL(0)/L˜0 0.31 0.36 0.18 0.27 0.47 0.10
dc(0)/c˜0 0.34 0.40 0.20 0.43 0.61 0.16
dI(0)/Y˜0 1.21 1.40 0.71 1.50 2.15 0.55
dca(0)/Y˜0 -1.21 -1.40 -0.71 -1.72 -2.46 -0.62
dS(0)/Y˜0 0 0 0 -0.22 -0.32 -0.08
Notes: All steady-state effects are reported as percentage changes relative to the initial
steady-state. Regarding the short-term variations, the table reports impact reactions
at time t = 0.
Whereas a rise in government spending crowds-out private consumption and stimulates
labor supply, a tax restructuring crowds-in consumption and encourages labor supply in the
LT. To have a better grasp of our result, it is convenient to split the steady-state changes into
a wealth effect and a tax effect :
dc˜
∣∣j,c = mλ¯dλ¯∣∣j,c +mτcdτ c∣∣j,c > 0, dL˜∣∣j,c = nλ¯dλ¯∣∣j,c + nτ jdτ j > 0, j = F,H, (28)
where mλ¯ < 0, mτc < 0, nλ¯ > 0, nτj < 0 (j = F,H); it can be shown formally that tax reform
strategy pushes down the marginal utility of wealth, irrespective of sectoral capital intensi-
ties. Households are induced to raise both consumption and labor can be easily understood
from inspection of (28). The tax effect which impinges negatively on the LT value of real
consumption displays a smaller size than its positive influence on labor since τ c must increase
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but by less than the size of the labor tax cut. In line with theoretical results, as shown by
row 2 in Table 5B, the steady-state rise in real consumption gets larger as the required rise
in the consumption tax rate gets smaller. For example, a payroll tax cut by 3% leads to an
increase in τ c by 1.3% (resp. 1.8%) if kN > kT (resp. kT > kN ) and c˜ is raised by 0.46%
(resp. 0.34%). While the steady-state increase in real consumption stems from the wealth
effect, the LT rise in labor supply originates from the tax effect. The smaller the fall in the
marginal utility of wealth and the larger the steady-state increase in L.
The LT change of the physical capital stock can be more easily discussed by differentiating
totally the market-clearing condition for non tradables:17
1
µ
(
Y NK − δK
)
dK˜
∣∣j,c + 1
µ
Y NL dL˜
∣∣j,c = dc˜N ∣∣j,c > 0, j = F,H, (29)
where Y NK −δK ≷ 0, Y NL ≶ 0, Y Nτ j ≷ 0 (j = F,H) depending on wether kN ≷ kT . While it can
be shown formally the capital stock rises in the LT, the mechanism behind this result requires
to consider two cases. If kN > kT (resp. kT > kN ), the labor outflow (resp. inflow) from (resp.
in) the more capital intensive sector reduces (resp. stimulates) Y N while the demand for the
non traded good rises. Consequently, an excess demand (resp. excess supply) arises which
requires a LT rise in the the capital stock. In any cases, the tax reform leads to an investment
boom which depresses the output of the relatively more labor intensive sector. As the open
economy accumulates physical capital K over the transition towards the steady-state, agents
reduce their foreign assets holding b˜. For the current account to be null in the LT, net exports
n˜x must rise to compensate the decrease in interest receipts from traded bonds holding.
As it can be seen from Table 5B, in line with theoretical results, a tax restructuring boosts
capital accumulation in the LT. Depending on wether employees or employers benefit from
the labor tax cut, the steady-state rise in the overall capital stock falls in the range between
0.38%-0.56% if τH is decreased and 0.33%-0.39% if τF is cut. While for our benchmark
parametrization, the former tax policy displays stronger effects on capital accumulation re-
gardless of sectoral capital-labor ratios, we show in the next section that this result depends
on the initial marginal tax wedge and the degree of tax progressiveness. The relevancy of
this discussion is supported by the cross-country comparison of the these two variables which
display sizeable differences.
A Cut in the Labor Income Tax or in the Payroll Tax?
In this section, we provide an analytical comparison of the steady-state effects of a tax
restructuring depending on wether the labor tax cut falls on the labor income tax or the
payroll tax, i. e.; depending on wether employees or employers benefit from the reduction in
τ j . A shift of the tax burden from labor taxes to consumption taxes implies that the LT effect
of a tax restructuring is a scaled-down version of the LT change after a cut in τ j financed
by lump-sum taxes. Irrespective of the labor tax cut benefit to employers or employees, the
scaled-down positive factor Φj,c is identical. The two tax reforms differ mainly in that the
LT change of x after a fall in τH is a scaled-down or a scaled-up version of the steady-state
change of x after a drop in τF . To see it more formally, we express the steady-state change
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of x after a cut in τH in terms of the LT variation of x following a reduction of τF :
dx˜
dτH
=
w˜ − κ
w˜
1 + τF
1− τH
dx˜
dτF
. (30)
Technically, the size of the positive term w˜−κw˜
1+τF
1−τH , which might be higher or smaller than
unity, depends on the initial tax wedge τM and the degree of tax progressiveness. Intuitively, a
cut in τF raises the wage rate and thereby the after-tax labor income by w˜ 1−τ
H
1+τF
≡ w˜ (1− τM).
Rather, a drop in τH leaves unaffected w and raises the after-tax labor income by (w˜ − κ).
In brief, a tax restructuring displays stronger positive effects on labor market if households
benefit from the labor tax cut than if payroll taxes are reduced as longer as tax allowances κ
gets smaller and the initial marginal tax wedge τM gets closer to unity.
Finally, an interesting feature is that the effectiveness of a tax restructuring decreases
with the degree of tax progressiveness, i. e. as tax allowances κ rises, since the taxable labor
income w − κ and thereby the incentive to raise labor supply gets smaller. In brief, the tax
progressiveness moderates the rise of the fall in the after-tax labor income and consequently
the LT effects of a tax restructuring which involves a cut in τH .
4.2 Dynamics Effects of Consumption and Labor Tax Reforms
Having discussed the steady-state changes, which influence in turn agents’ expectations be-
cause of the perfect foresight property, we now investigate the dynamic effects of a shift of
the tax burden from labor taxes (i. e. a cut in τ j , j = F,H) to consumption taxes (i. e. a
rise in τ c).
If kT > kN , the dynamics of the relative price of non tradables degenerate so that labor
and real consumption increase immediately to their final LT levels. Instead, if kN > kT , the
temporal path of the real exchange rate is no longer flat which in turns restores the transitional
dynamics for consumption and labor. Figures 1 portray the computed transitional paths for
the real exchange rate, consumption, labor, investment, savings and the current account after
a tax restructuring involving simultaneously cutting τH and raising τ c.18 The increase in the
after-tax labor income induces a positive wealth effect which boosts consumption as shown in
Figures 1(c) and 1(a). As demand for non tradables rises and labor shifts towards the more
labor intensive sector, an excess demand arises in the non traded good market. This excess
demand appreciates the real exchange rate on impact by 0.05% (see Table 5C); more formally,
dp(0)|j,c = −ω12dK˜|j,c > 0. The rise in the relative price of non tradables softens the initial
upward jumps of real consumption and labor supply by raising the consumption price index
and reducing the real wage:
dc(0)
∣∣j,c = dc˜∣∣j,c + cpdp(0)∣∣j,c > 0, j = F,H, (31a)
dL(0)
∣∣j,c = dL˜∣∣j,c + Lpdp(0)∣∣j,c > 0, j = F,H, (31b)
where cp < 0 and Lp < 0 (if kN > kT ). The rise in private wealth induces agents to raise
consumption by about 0.6% and increase labor supply by 0.5%.
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Figure 1: Computed Transitional Paths after a Fall in τH and a Rise in τ c
∣∣H,c - Case kN > kT
The real exchange appreciation attracts resources in the non traded sector if kN > kT
which in turn leads to an investment boom on impact:
dI(0)
∣∣j,c = Y NL dL(0)∣∣j,c − Yˆ Np dp(0)∣∣j,c − dcN (0)∣∣j,c > 0, (32)
where we used the fact that the capital stock is initially given, i. e. K(0) = K0 and we
denoted by the superscript hat the derivative of Y N with respect to p for given employment
(set σL = 0). If kT > kN , the influence of the real exchange vanishes; the increase in total
employment induces a shift of labor away from the traded sector towards the non traded
sector; this leads to a positive investment flow even whereas the rise in consumption in non
tradables withdraws resources to capital accumulation. Interestingly, as shown in Table 5C,
a tax reform crowds-in investment by more if kN > kT than with the reversal of capital
intensities (i e. 1.5% and 2.1% rather than 1.2% and 2.4%). The explanation is that the real
exchange rate appreciation on impact attracts resources in the non traded sector and thereby
stimulates capital accumulation further in the ST .
Since capital accumulation is crowded-in further by a tax restructuring in the case kN > kT
and agents decumulate financial wealth, the open country experiences a larger current account
deficit as shown by row 4 in Table 5C (i e. -1.7% and -2.5% rather than -1.2% and -1.4%).
Along the transitional path, the real exchange rate must depreciate to revert back to its
initial level. By increasing the consumption-based real interest rate and the real wage, the
real exchange rate depreciation induces a rising temporal paths for consumption and labor
which in turn drives progressively down the size of the investment flow and consequently the
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size of the current account deficit. If kT > kN , savings is unaffected because the positive
investment flow is exactly matched by a current account deficit.
4.3 A Labor Tax Restructuring
In this section, we explore the effects of a labor tax reform strategy denoted by the superscript
{F,H} which involves simultaneously cutting a payroll tax by dτF < 0 and increasing the
labor income tax dτH > 0 so as to leave unaffected the marginal tax wedge (i. e. dτM = 0).
The labor tax reform strategy requires a rise in the wage income tax by an amount given by:
dτH
∣∣F,H ≡ −θdτF , θ ≡ 1− τH
1 + τF
< 1. (33)
From (33), the labor income tax must be increased by a smaller amount than the fall in τF
for leaving unchanged the marginal tax wedge. In short, since the tax rate on a relatively
large base is reduced and the tax rate on a relatively small base is increased, the latter must
rise by a smaller proportion than the former decreases so as to leave unchanged τM .
The LT change of x = c, L,K following a cut in τF coordinated with a rise in τH by an
amount given by (33) writes as follows:19
dx˜
∣∣F,H = ΦF,H dx˜
dτF
=
κ
w˜
dτF , (34)
where ΦF,H ≡ κ/w˜ < 1. As longer as the labor income tax rate is progressive, i. e. κ > 0,
then the labor tax reform leaving constant the marginal tax wedge affects the LT equilibrium
of the economy. More specifically, the steady-state increases in consumption, employment and
capital stock are a scaled-down version of their LT changes following a labor tax cut financed
by lump-sum taxes.
Interestingly, tax progression benefits employment and overall economic activity because
the wage rate unambiguously rises as it can be shown formally:
dwA
∣∣F,H = −κ(1− τH
1 + τF
)
dτF > 0, (35)
where we assume that dτF < 0. As the wage rate is permanently raised and labor supply
is mostly determined by the tax effect, employment rises in the LT. More specifically, as the
degree of tax progression rises, as reflected by an increase in tax allowances κ, the rise in the
after-tax labor income gets larger which in turn magnifies the beneficial effects on employment
and overall economic activity.20 Instead, if κ is set to zero, then a larger rise in τH is required
so that the LT equilibrium of the open economy remains unchanged.
What is the effect of the reform on public revenue? The overall effect of a labor tax
restructuring so as to leave unaffected τM induces two conflictory effects on public revenue.
Without tax base effects, a negative revenue effect would arise. Intuitively, the tax rate on
a relatively large tax base is lowered while the tax rate on a relatively small base is raised.
However, via the tax effect for employment and the wealth effect for consumption, the tax
bases increase but not sufficiently as as to offset the negative tax rate effect. Accordingly,
lump-sum transfers drop by -3.39% if kT > kN and -0.85% if kN > kT .
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4.4 Short-Term and Long-Term Tax Multipliers
Having discussed the steady-state and dynamics effects, we now investigate the effectiveness
of the three tax reform strategies by calculating the LT and ST tax multipliers for output at
an overall and a sectoral level.
The Overall Tax Multiplier
Using the fact that in the LT, overall output equalizes its demand counterpart, differenti-
ating by adopting a similar procedure than we used previously, and keeping in mind that the
steady-state level of the relative price of non tradables is not affected by a tax restructuring,
the LT tax multiplier for overall output is given by:21
dY˜
∣∣j,k = pcdc˜∣∣j,k + dn˜x∣∣j,k + p˜dI˜∣∣j,k > 0, (36)
where we denoted net exports by nx ≡ Y T − (cT + gT ). According to (36), the the domestic
demand boom for consumption and investment goods is strengthened by a trade balance
improvement. Since the tax reform raises overall demand, aggregate output unambiguously
rises in the LT. Table 6 reports the numerical values of LT tax multipliers for overall output.
For the benchmark parametrization, the LT multipliers are positive and fall in the range
between 0.06-0.25. As expected, a revenue-neutral tax reform displays larger beneficial effects
than a strategy keeping the tax wedge constant since in the latter case the demand boom is
strongly moderated by the fall in lump-sump transfers.
We now derive the ST change of overall output by linearizing overall demand for the
domestic good, i. e. Y = pcc +
(
gT + pgN
)
+ p(t)I(t) + nx(t), evaluating at time t = 0 and
differentiating the resulting linearized version of this expression:22
dY (0)
∣∣j,k = pcdc(0)∣∣j,k + p˜dI(0)∣∣j,k + Y˜ Ndp(0)∣∣j,k + dnx(0)∣∣j,k > 0. (37)
The change of overall output on impact is driven by the initial demand boom for consumption
goods and investment goods together with the strong real exchange rate appreciation which
raises the value of non traded output when expressed in terms of the traded good. While in
the LT, the trade balance improvement raises further GDP, the fall in net exports on impact,
which reflects the current account deficit, lowers the effectiveness of the tax reform.
Let now investigate wether a tax reform displays more beneficial effects in the ST or in
the LT. While the ST change of output benefits from the real exchange rate appreciation, the
steady-state rise in net exports raises the steady-state value of GDP above that in the ST:
0 < dY (0)
∣∣j,k < dY˜ ∣∣j,k. (38)
The numerical values reported in the Table 6 show that the tax multiplier is 1/3 or 50% smaller
in the ST than in the LT depending on wether the traded sector is more or less capital intensive
than the non traded sector. The smaller size of the ST tax multiplier stems from the fact that
part of the additional labor income is devoted to imports on impact which reduces as much
as the demand for the domestic good. In addition, the ST tax multiplier is reduced further
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Table 6: LT and ST Tax Multipliers for Overall Output
kT > kN kN > kT
Tax Reform dτF dτH dτF dτF dτH dτF
Financed by dτ c dτ c dτH dτ c dτ c dτH
Long-Term 0.16 0.18 0.09 0.16 0.25 0.06
Short-term 0.10 0.14 0.06 0.08 0.13 0.03
Notes: The tax multipliers display the effects on the rate of change
of GDP of a cut in labor taxes equal to -1 % point of initial GDP.
since the strong real exchange rate appreciation on impact raises the consumption price index
which thereby depresses private demand.
The Sectoral Tax Multiplier
So far, we investigated the effectiveness at the level of the overall economy. One central
question in a two-sector model is: Which sector will benefit by more the tax reform strategy?
We now show formally that regardless of sectoral capital intensities or the kind of tax reform,
the tax multipliers in the traded and the non traded sector are both positive which implies
that a sector does not expand at the expense of the other sector.
Table 7: LT and ST Tax Multipliers for Y T and Y N
kT > kN kN > kT
Tax Reform dτF dτH dτF dτF dτH dτF
Financed by dτ c dτ c dτH dτ c dτ c dτH
Long-Term
Sector T 0.09 0.10 0.05 0.09 0.13 0.03
Sector N 0.07 0.08 0.04 0.08 0.11 0.03
Short-Term
Sector T -0.53 -0.62 -0.31 -0.63 -0.91 -0.23
Sector N 0.64 0.74 0.37 0.71 1.02 0.26
Using the market-clearing condition together with the null current account equation to
derive the LT expenditure multipliers in the non traded and traded sector respectively:
1
µ
dY˜ N
∣∣j,k = dc˜N ∣∣j,k + dI˜∣∣j,k > 0, (39a)
dY˜ T
∣∣j,k = dn˜x∣∣j,k + dc˜T ∣∣j,k > 0. (39b)
Since a tax restructuring induces a positive wealth effect by raising the after-tax labor income,
the demand for both the traded and the non traded consumption goods unambiguously rises.
Additionally, while the traded sector benefits from the trade balance improvement, the LT
stimulus of capital investment boosts the non traded output. Consequently tax multipliers
are positive in both sectors. It is worthwhile noticing that in the LT, the economic boom in
sector N enhances the traded output. The explanation is that the LT capital accumulation
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drives the current account into deficit which requires a steady-state improvement in the trade
balance. The numerical values reported in Table 7 show that the steady-state improvement
in the trade balance raises the LT tax multiplier in sector T above the LT tax multiplier in
sector N. However, the sectoral discrepancy is modest. In conclusion, while the tradable share
in overall output is about 1/3, its contribution to the growth of GDP amounts to about one
half.
Interestingly, we get a different picture in the ST:
1
µ
dY N (0)
∣∣j,k = dcN (0)∣∣j,k + dI(0)∣∣j,k > 0, (40a)
dY T (0)
∣∣j,k = dnx(0)∣∣j,k + dcT (0)∣∣j,k ≷ 0. (40b)
From (40a), output in sector N is unambiguously stimulated by the domestic demand boom
for consumption and investment goods I. Unlike, in the traded sector, the dramatic drop in
net exports on impact now counteracts the positive influence of the domestic demand boom
for the traded good. If kT > kN , it can be proven formally that the tax multiplier in the
traded sector is negative on impact which reflects the fact that the trade balance deficit more
than outweighs the domestic demand boom. With the reversal of capital intensities, we cannot
exclude that the short-tern tax multiplier is positive in the traded sector. Numerical values
of ST sectoral tax multipliers summarized in Table 7 show that output in sector T drops on
impact while the economic boom in sector N is sizeable. Considerable discrepancy in the
sectoral economic stance stemming from the I boom and the trade balance deficit in the ST.
4.5 Welfare Effects
Since the ultimate objective of individuals is their satisfaction, it is appropriate to study
the welfare effects of a tax reform. We start by the investigation of instantaneous welfare
dynamics which is denoted by ξ ≡ u (c(t)) + v (L(t)). Linearizing the felicity function in the
neighborhood of the steady-state, then substituting the formal solution for p given by (19),
we get the stable path for ξ(t).
Welfare effects may be most easily interpreted by contrasting the LT and ST reactions:
dφ˜
∣∣j,k = Φj,k [uc dc˜dτ j + vL dL˜dτ j
]
dτ j , dφ(0)
∣∣j,k = dφ˜∣∣j,k + ΞdK˜∣∣j,k, (41)
where 0 < Φj,k < 1 and dK˜
∣∣j,k > 0; the term Ξ is positive for the benchmark parametrization.
Whereas households have welfare gains from higher consumption, they are subject to utility
losses triggered by labor supply. If kT > kN , the former predominates over the latter such
that φ unambiguously rises in the LT. Instead, if kN > kT , the households’ wealth is affected
permanently by the transitional adjustment of the relative price of non tradables which raises
further labor supply and moderates the LT rise in real consumption.
In order to have an appealing measure of welfare, we estimate a measure of overall welfare
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Table 8: Overall Welfare Effects of a Tax Reform
kT > kN kN > kT
Tax Reform dτF dτH dτF dτF dτH dτF
Financed by dτ c dτ c dτH dτ c dτ c dτH
Overall Welfare 0.05 0.06 0.03 0.09 0.12 0.03
which is defined by the discounted value of felicity flows over an infinite horizon:
U =
∫ ∞
0
ξ(t)e−βtdt. (42)
Substituting the stable solution for φ(t) and integrating, evaluating the resulting expression
at time t = 0 and differentiating, we get:
dU
∣∣j,k = 1
β
dξ˜
∣∣j,k + d
(
ξ(0)
∣∣j,k − ξ˜∣∣j,k)
r? − ν1 . (43)
The LT rise in ξ raises overall welfare while its transitional adjustment (which raises further U)
reflected by the second term on the RHS of (43) exerts a small influence. The computed overall
welfare gains are summarized in Table 8. Numerical results show that a tax restructuring
always raises households’ stance in utility terms which fall in the range between 0.03% and
0.12%. Besides the effectiveness gains it induces, a tax reform yields welfare improvement.
5 Sensitivity Analysis
One important contribution of our analysis is to shed light on the roles of two critical param-
eters in determining the size of the tax multiplier: [i] the elasticity of labor supply σL and [ii]
the degree of tax progressiveness Γ.
Tax Multipliers
Figures 2(a)-2(b) portray the LT and ST overall tax multipliers against σL. Like Baxter et
King [1993], the LT tax multiplier rises with σL. As labor gets more responsive to the rise in
the after-tax labor income, the excess of demand (resp. supply) in the non traded good market
gets larger if kN > kT (resp. if kT > kN ), the physical capital investment must be crowded-in
further to clear the good market, and thereby the LT multiplier gets larger. However, unlike
Baxter and King [1993], the relationship between the ST tax multiplier and the elasticity labor
supply displays a hump-shaped pattern. As labor supply gets more responsive, the excess of
demand in the non traded good market gets larger, the real exchange appreciates by more
on impact which in turn softens further the ST demand boom for consumption goods. Along
the slippery slope side, the depressing effect on domestic demand triggered by the impact
appreciation in p more than offsets the stimulating effect induced by the rise in the after-tax
labor income.
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Figure 2: Sensitivity of the Overall and Sectoral Tax Multipliers to the Degree of Tax Pro-
gressiveness and σL
Figure 2(c) traces out the LT tax multiplier against the degree of tax progressiveness.
According to our measure, the tax scheme gets more progressive as the indicator Γ gets
larger. Ceteris paribus, an increase in tax allowances κ at a given wage rate yields an increase
in average tax progression. Figure 2(c) shows that the LT tax multiplier falls or rises with the
degree of tax progressiveness depending on wether the tax reform is revenue neutral or keeps
the tax wedge constant. In the latter case, the depressing effect triggered by higher labor
income tax rate gets smaller as the tax scheme gets more progressive. Instead, in the former
case, labor rises by less since the after-tax labor income increases by a smaller amount.
Finally, we get a more complete and interesting picture of a tax reform by conducting a
sensitivity analysis at a sectoral level. The figure 2(d) traces out the ST sectoral tax multiplier
against the elasticity of labor supply in the case kN > kT and for a tax reform strategy which
moves the tax burden from payroll taxes to consumption taxes. Interestingly, the ST tax
multiplier in the non traded sector rises and in the traded sector falls as labor supply gets
more responsive. The explanation is as follows. As labor supply displays more reactiveness
to the rise in the after-tax labor income, the employment outflow (and thereby the excess
demand in the non traded good market) gets larger. Consequently, the tax reform crowds-in
investment by more which in turn drives the current account (and hence the trade balance)
into a larger deficit. In short, while the initial boom for capital goods boosts the non traded
output, the dramatic drop in net exports on impact depressed the traded output.
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6 Conclusion
We employ a two-sector open economy version of the dynamic general equilibrium model by
Baxter and King [1993] to examine the potential benefits of three tax restructuring. Based
on empirical evidence, we distinguish between a traded and a non traded sector and assume
the non tradables are produced by an imperfectly competitive sector. In line with general
practice, we assume that wage taxes are progressive whereas payroll taxes are supposed to be
proportional. We consider two budget-neutral strategies that shifts the payroll or personal
labor income taxes to consumption taxes and one strategy keeping the marginal tax wedge
constant that reduces the taxes paid by employers and raises the taxes paid by employees.
Irrespective of sectoral capital intensities, consumption and investment are unambiguously
crowded-in and employment is permanently raised, as long as the consumption tax base is
larger than the labor tax base. While the steady-state increase in consumption is driven by
a positive wealth effect, the steady-state rise in employment is driven by the higher after-tax
labor wage induced by the labor tax cut. The second finding is that the shift of the tax
burden from labor taxes to consumption taxes so as to keep the tax revenue fixed is more
effective than a strategy keeping the tax wedge constant. While estimating the effectiveness
of the tax reform by calculating the tax multiplier, numerical results show that the long-term
tax multiplier rises or falls with the degree of tax progressiveness depending on wether the
tax reform keeps the tax wedge constant or keeps the government budget balanced.
Regardless of the type of tax reform, the sensitivity analysis shows that the long-term
tax multiplier for overall output rises monotonically with elasticity of labor supply. Unlike,
the relationship between the short-term tax and labor responsiveness displays a hump-shaped
pattern stemming from the depressing effect on domestic demand triggered by the real ex-
change rate appreciation. One major question in a two-sector country is: Which sector will
benefit by more from the tax reform? The answer to this question highlights the central role
of the trade balance. Since net exports must rise in the long-term to exactly offset the fall
in net interest earnings from foreign assets holding, the long-term tax multiplier is always
higher in the traded sector than in the non-traded sector. However, the computed sectoral
discrepancy is not considerable. Interestingly, the result is reversed in the short-term. In
the traded sector, the dramatic drop in net exports on impact now counteracts the positive
influence of the domestic demand boom for the traded good. Numerical results show a con-
siderable discrepancy in the sectoral economic stance stemming from the investment boom
which boosts the non traded sector output and the trade balance deficit which depresses the
traded output.
Notes
1Another branch of the literature, exemplified by the work of Mankiw and Weinzierl [2006] and Leeper and
Yang [2008], focuses on capital and labor tax cuts and estimates to what extent reductions in capital and labor
income tax rates expand the tax base to offset revenue losses.
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2While the two-revenue neutral tax reforms lowers the marginal tax wedge constant, we consider a third
strategy which involves simultaneously cutting payroll taxes and raising labor income taxes so as to keep the
tax wedge constant. Whereas this labor tax restructuring does no longer keep the tax revenue fixed, it allows
us to focus on the composition on the tax wedge rather than its level.
3The labor income tax rate encompasses the social security contributions paid by employees together with
personal income taxes.
4We restrict the countries panel table to the biggest OECD countries. A more complete picture is presented
is an Appendix available by the author on request.
5This particular subutility function (1) because it yields a constant price elasticity demand equations for
each variety. We follow Startz [1989] in specifying the leading term in the subutility function, n
1
1−σ ; this
formulation is adopted for reason of analytical simplicity since it eliminates the “taste of variety” inherent in
the usual CES form. Hence, individuals only care about the overall amount cN which is consumed and thus
adopt a neutral attitude towards variety.
6See Greenwood et al. [1988] who specify a similar form for v(L).
7Overall fixed costs nFC are thus covered by setting the price above the marginal cost, i. e. by paying
inputs below their marginal products.
8To obtain static solutions for traded and non traded output, we first solve (13e) and (13f) for LT and LN .
We get LT = LT
(
K, p, λ¯, τF , τH
)
, LN = LN
(
K, p, λ¯, τF , τH
)
with LTK ≶ 0, LTλ¯ ≷ 0, LNK ≷ 0, LNλ¯ ≶ 0, LTτj ≶ 0
and LNτj ≷ 0 (with j = H,F ) according to wether kN ≷ kT , together with LTp < 0 and LNp > 0.
9To determine the accumulation equation of foreign bonds (13j), we substituted the definition of trans-
fers Z together with the non traded goods market-clearing condition (13i) into (6) and used the fact that(
rK + δK
)
KN + wFLN ≡ p
µ
Y N and rKKT + wFLT ≡ Y T .
10If kN > kT , the sign of Φ1 = −p˜
[
1 +
ω12
p˜µ2
(
σcc˜
N − σLL˜k˜T (µ2 + δK) Λ˜
)]
is not clear-cut. Since for a large
range of parametrization, Φ1 is always negative, we assume that capital accumulation deteriorates the current
account.
11Intuitively, if kN > kT , an increase in demand for the non traded good causes a real exchange appreciation
which shifts labor in sector N and thereby stimulates capital accumulation. The combined effect of the negative
savings flow and the positive investment flow drives the current account into deficit over entire transition
towards the LT equilibrium.
12In the second step, we insert (23) into the economy’s intertemporal budget constraint (i. e. equation
(22d)), which may be solved for the equilibrium value of the marginal utility of wealth: λ¯ = g
(
τ c, τF , τH
)
,
with λτc < 0, λτF > 0, λτH > 0.
13If kN > kT , the sign of Kλ¯ is not clear-cut. However, for a large range of parametrization, numerical
results show that σLL˜k˜
Tµ2Λ˜− σcc˜N > 0 which reflects the fact that the labor response is stronger than that
of consumption to the real exchange rate depreciation over the transitional adjustment.
14While it can be proven formally that the consumption tax rate effect is large enough to more than offsets
the consumption tax base effect as longer as a˜ > 0, such a condition cannot longer be derived for determining
the sign of χj .
15The derivation of (27) requires to rewrite first the steady-state variation of x after a rise in τ c in terms
of that after a change of τ j financed by lump-sum taxes: dx˜
dτc
= 1
1+τc
dx˜
dτj
Ξj , with ΞF = 1+τ
F
Λ˜
> 0 and
ΞH = w˜
A
w˜−κ > 0. Formal details can be retrieved in Appendix F.
16More specifically, using the steady-state version of the budget constraint of households, we can express the
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share in real disposable income of interest earnings from assets holding plus lump-sum transfers as follows:
r?a˜+ Z
pcc˜
= 1− w˜
AL˜
pcc˜
,
A sufficient condition for the expression to be positive is that a˜ > 0.
17We found convenient to rewrite at the steady-state the ST static solutions for traded and non traded
output given by (18) as Y˜ T = Y T
(
K˜, L˜, p˜
)
and Y˜ N = Y N
(
K˜, L˜, p˜
)
.
18Since computed transitional paths are similar for either three tax reforms, the dynamics portrayed in
Figure 1 of the two-sector economy is restricted to a cut in the labor income tax coordinated with a rise in the
consumption tax that keeps the government budget constraint balanced.
19To derive (34), we used the fact that dx˜
dτH
=
(w˜−κ)(1+τF )
w˜(1−τH)
dx˜
∂τF
.
20Both the steady-state and the dynamic effects are similar to that derived in sections 4.1 and 4.2; hence we
do not discuss them further.
21Using the market-clearing condition, i. e. Y˜
N
µ
= c˜N + gN + I˜, and the null current account, i. e. Y˜ T =(
c˜T + gT
)− r?b˜, aggregating and differentiating, we get (36).
22Using the fact that Y ≡ Y T + p
µ
Y N , and keeping in mind that the capital stock is initially predetermined,
the ST tax multiplier can be written as follows:
dY (0)
∣∣j,k = wFdL(0)∣∣j,k > 0.
Since labor rises on impact as the after-tax labor income increases, the ST tax multiplier is unambiguously
positive, irrespective of sectoral capital intensities and regardless of the kind of the tax reform strategy.
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A Short-Run Static Solutions
A.1 Short-Run Static Solutions for Consumption-Side
Short-run static solutions for real consumption and labor supply are derived from the first-
order conditions (13a) and (13b):
c = c
(
λ¯, p, τ c
)
, L = L
(
λ¯, p, τF , τH
)
, (44)
with
cλ¯ =
∂c
∂λ¯
= −σc c
λ¯
< 0, (45a)
cp =
∂c
∂p
= −αcσc c
p
< 0, (45b)
cτc =
∂c
∂τ c
= −σc c(1 + τ c) < 0, (45c)
Lλ¯ =
∂L
∂λ¯
= σL
L
λ¯
> 0, (45d)
Lp =
∂L
∂p
= σLL
wp
(
1− τH)
wA
= −σLL Λ
wF
kTh
µ (kN − kT ) ≶ 0, (45e)
LτF =
∂L
∂τF
= −σLL
wτF
(
1− τH)
wA
= −σLL Λ(1 + τF ) < 0, (45f)
LτH =
∂L
∂τH
= −σLL(w − κ)
wA
< 0, (45g)
where σc = − ucuccc > 0 corresponds to the intertemporal elasticity of substitution for con-
sumption, σL = vLvLLL > 0 represents the intertemporal elasticity for labor. We denoted by
0 < Λ ≡ (1−τ
H)[
(1−τH)+ τHκ
w
] < 1 as longer as κ > 0; if κ = 0, then Λ = 1. According to (45f),
labor supply decreases or increases following a real exchange rate appreciation depending on
wether kN ≷ kT .
Denoting by φ the intratemporal elasticity of substitution between the tradable and the
non tradable good and inserting short-run solution for consumption (44) into intra-temporal
allocations between non tradable and tradable goods, we solve for cT and cN :
cT = cT
(
λ¯, p, τ c
)
, cN = cN
(
λ¯, p, τ c
)
, (46)
with
cTλ¯ = −σc
cT
λ¯
< 0, (47a)
cTp = αc
cT
p
(φ− σc) ≶ 0, (47b)
cTτc = −σc
cT
(1 + τ c)
< 0, (47c)
cNλ¯ = −σc
cN
λ¯
< 0, (47d)
cNp = −
cN
p
[(1− αc)φ+ αcσc] < 0, (47e)
cNτc = −σc
cN
(1 + τ c)
< 0, (47f)
where we used the fact that −p′′c pp′c = φ (1− αc) > 0 and p
′
cc = c
N .
A.2 Short-Run Static Solutions for Production-Side
Capital-Labor Ratios
From static optimality conditions (13c) and (13d), we may express sector capital-labor
ratios as functions of the real exchange rate:
kT = kT (p) , kN = kN (p) , (48)
with
kTp =
∂kT
∂p
=
h
µfkk (kN − kT ) , (49a)
kNp =
∂kN
∂p
=
µf
p2hkk (kN − kT ) . (49b)
Wage
From the first-order condition (13d) , we can solve for the wage rate:
w = w
(
p, τF
)
, (50)
with
wp =
∂w
∂p
= −k
T fkkk
T
p
(1 + τF )
= − k
T
(1 + τF )
h
µ (kN − kT ) ≶ 0, (51a)
wτF =
∂w
∂τF
= − w
(1 + τF )
< 0. (51b)
Labor
Substituting short-run static solutions for labor (44) and capital-labor ratios (48) into
sectoral inputs allocation constraints (13e) and (13f), we can solve for traded and non traded
labor as follows:
LT = LT
(
K, p, λ¯, τF , τH
)
, LN = LN
(
K, p, λ¯, τF , τH
)
, (52)
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with
LTK =
∂LT
∂K
=
1
kT − kN ≶ 0, (53a)
LTp =
∂LT
∂p
=
1
µ (kN − kT )2
[
LTh
fkk
+
µ2LNf
p2hkk
− σLL Λ
wF
kTkNh
]
< 0, (53b)
LTλ¯ =
∂LT
∂λ¯
= σL
L
λ¯
kN
kN − kT ≷ 0, (53c)
LTτF =
∂LT
∂τF
= − k
N
kN − kT σLL
Λ
(1 + τF )
≶ 0, (53d)
LTτH =
∂LT
∂τH
= − k
N
kN − kT σLL
(w − κ)
wA
≶ 0, (53e)
LNK =
∂LN
∂K
=
1
kN − kT ≷ 0, (53f)
LNp =
∂LN
∂p
= − 1
µ (kN − kT )2
[
LTh
fkk
+
µ2LNf
p2hkk
− σLL Λ
wF
(
kT
)2
h
]
> 0, (53g)
LNλ¯ =
∂LN
∂λ¯
= −σLL
λ¯
kT
kN − kT ≶ 0, (53h)
LNτF =
∂LT
∂τF
=
kT
kN − kT σLL
Λ
(1 + τF )
≷ 0, (53i)
LNτH =
∂LN
∂τH
=
kT
kN − kT σLL
(w − κ)
wA
≷ 0, (53j)
where wF = w
(
1 + τF
)
. From (53a) and (53f), when the capital stock rises, labor must shift
to the sector which is relatively more capital intensive. From (53b) and (53g), a rise in the
relative price of non tradable goods (lowers the capital-labor ratios) causes a shift of labor
from the traded to the non-traded sector, irrespective of the sectoral capital intensities. From
(53c) and (53h), an increase in the marginal utility of wealth raises the labor supplied by
households which leads to a shift of labor to the sector which is relatively less capital capital
intensive. From (53d)-(53e) and (53i)-(53j), a rise in the tax rate τF paid by firms or an
increase in the tax rate τH paid by households reduces unambiguously total employment L
which leads to a shift of labor towards the sector which is relatively more capital intensive.
Output
Inserting short-run static solutions for capital-labor ratios (48) and for labor (53) into the
production functions, we can solve for the traded, Y T = LTkT , and the non traded output,
Y N = LNhN :
Y T = Y T
(
K, p, λ¯, τF , τH
)
, Y N = Y N
(
K, p, λ¯, τF , τH
)
, (54)
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with
Y TK =
∂Y T
∂K
= − f
kN − kT ≶ 0, (55a)
Y Tp =
∂Y T
∂p
=
1
µ (kN − kT )2
[
pLT (h)2
µfkk
+
LN (µf)2
(p)2 hkk
− σLL Λ
wF
kTkNhf
]
< 0, (55b)
Y Tλ¯ =
∂Y T
∂λ¯
= σL
L
λ¯
kNf
kN − kT ≷ 0, (55c)
Y TτF =
∂Y T
∂τF
= − k
Nf
kN − kT σLL
Λ
(1 + τF )
≶ 0, (55d)
Y TτH =
∂Y T
∂τH
= − k
Nf
kN − kT σLL
(w − κ)
wA
≶ 0, (55e)
Y NK =
∂Y N
∂K
=
h
kN − kT ≷ 0, (55f)
Y Np =
∂Y N
∂p
= − 1
p (kN − kT )2
[
pLT (h)2
µfkk
+
LN (µf)2
p2hkk
− p
µ
σLL
Λ
wF
(
kTh
)2]
> 0.(55g)
Y Nλ¯ =
∂Y N
∂λ¯
= −σLL
λ¯
kTh
kN − kT ≶ 0, (55h)
Y NτF =
∂Y N
∂τF
=
kTh
kN − kT σLL
Λ
(1 + τF )
≷ 0, (55i)
Y NτH =
∂Y N
∂τH
=
kTh
kN − kT σLL
(w − κ)
wA
≷ 0. (55j)
From (55b) and (55g), an appreciation in the real exchange rate attracts resources from the
traded to the non traded sector which in turn raises the output of the latter. From (55a)
and (55f), a rise in the capital stock raises the output of the sector which is relatively more
capital intensive. From (55c) and (55h), an increase in the marginal utility of wealth lowers
the output in the sector which is relatively less capital intensive. From (55d)-(55e) and (55i)-
(55j), higher wage taxes, whatever they are levied on employers or employees depress total
employment and favor the output in the sector which is relatively more capital intensive. As
it will be useful to calculate fiscal multipliers, we give the partial derivatives of output in the
traded and the non traded sector w. r. t. total employment:
Y TL =
∂Y T
∂L
=
kNf
kN − kT ≷ 0, Y
N
L =
∂Y N
∂L
= − k
Th
kN − kT ≶ 0. (56)
Useful Properties
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Making use of (55b) and (55g), (55a) and (55f), we deduce the following useful properties:
Y Tp + p
Y Np
µ
= −σLLΛ k
Th
µ (kN − kT ) ≶ 0, (57a)
µY TK + pY
N
K =
µf − ph
kT − kN = phk = µfk, (57b)
Y TL + p
Y NL
µ
= wF , (57c)
Y Tλ¯ + p
Y N
λ¯
µ
= σL
L
λ¯
(
kNµf − kT ph)
µ (kN − kT ) = σL
L
λ¯
wF > 0, (57d)
Y TτF + p
Y N
τF
µ
= −σLLwΛ < 0, (57e)
Y TτH + p
Y N
τH
µ
= −σLL(w − κ)
wA
wF < 0, (57f)
where we used the fact that µf ≡ p [h− hk (kN − kT )] and kNµf − kT ph =
p
(
h− hKkN) (kN − kT ) = µwF (kN − kT ).
In addition, using the fact that rK = fk
[
kT (p, µ)
]
, the rental rate of capital denoted by
rK can be expressed as a function of the real exchange rate p and the mark-up µ:
rK = rK (p) , (58)
with partial derivatives given by:
rKp ≡
∂rK
∂p
=
h
µ (kN − kT ) ≷ 0. (59a)
B Equilibrium Dynamics and Formal Solutions
Inserting short-run static solutions (44), (46) and (54) into (13h) and (13i), we obtain:
K˙ =
1
µ
Y N
(
K, p, λ¯, τF , τH
)− cN (λ¯, p, τ c)− δKK − gN , (60a)
p˙ = p
[
r? − hk (p)
µ
]
. (60b)
Linearizing these two equations around the steady-state, and denoting x˜ = K˜, p˜ the long-term
values of x = K, p, we obtain in a matrix form:(
K˙, p˙
)T
= J
(
K(t)− K˜, p(t)− p˜
)T
, (61)
where J is given by
J ≡
(
b11 b12
b21 b22
)
, (62)
with
b11 =
Y NK
µ
− δK = h˜
µ
(
k˜N − k˜T
) − δK ≷ 0, b12 = Y Np
µ
− cNp > 0, (63a)
b21 = 0, b22 = −p˜
hkkk
N
p
µ
= − f˜
p˜
(
k˜N − k˜T
) = Y TK
p˜
≶ 0. (63b)
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Equilibrium Dynamics
By denoting ν the eigenvalue of matrix J, the characteristic equation for the matrix of the
linearized system (61) can be written as follows:
ν2 − 1
p˜µ
(
µY TK + p˜Y
N
K
)
ν +
Y TK
p˜
(
Y NK
µ
− δK
)
= 0, (64)
where we used the fact that − p˜hkkkNpµ =
Y TK
p˜ .
The determinant denoted by Det of the linearized 2 × 2 matrix (61) is unambiguously
negative:1
Det J = b11b22 =
Y TK
p˜
(
Y NK
µ
− δK
)
= − f˜ h˜
µp˜
(
k˜N − k˜T
)2 − δK Y TKp˜ < 0, (65)
and the trace denoted by Tr given by
Tr J = b11 + b22 =
1
p˜µ
(
µY TK + p˜Y
N
K
)− δK = hk
µ
− δK = r? > 0, (66)
where we used the fact that at the long-run equilibrium hkµ = r
? + δK .
From (61), the characteristic root obtained from J writes as follows:
νi ≡ 12
r? ±
√
(r?)2 − 4Y
T
K
p˜
(
Y NK
µ
− δK
) ≷ 0, i = 1, 2. (67)
Using (66), then (67) can be rewritten as follows:
νi ≡ 12
{
r? ±
[
Y TK
p˜
−
(
Y NK
µ
− δK
)]}
≷ 0, i = 1, 2. (68)
We denote by ν1 < 0 and ν2 > 0 the stable and unstable real eigenvalues, satisfying
ν1 < 0 < r? < ν2. (69)
Since the system features one state variable, K, and one jump variable, p, the equilibrium
yields a unique one-dimensional stable saddle-path.
Formal Solutions
General solutions paths are given by :
K(t)− K˜ = B1eν1t +B2eν2t, (70a)
p(t)− p˜ = ω12B1eν1t + ω22B2eν2t, (70b)
where we normalized ωi1 to unity. The eigenvector ω
i
2 associated with eigenvalue µi is given
by
ωi2 =
νi − b11
b12
, (71)
1Starting from the equality of labor marginal products between sectors, using the fact that fk = phk and
hk = r
? + δK , it is straightforward to prove that b11 is positive in the case k
N > kT .
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with
b11 =
Y NK
µ
− δK = h˜
µ
(
k˜N − k˜T
) − δK ≷ 0, (72a)
b12 =
Y Np
µ
− cNp > 0, (72b)
where cNp is given by (47e).
Case kN > kT
This assumption reflects the fact that the capital-labor ratio of the non traded good sector
exceeds the capital-labor of the traded sector. From (68), the stable and unstable eigenvalues
can be rewritten as follows:
ν1 = − f˜
p˜
(
k˜N − k˜T
) < 0, (73a)
ν2 =
h˜
µ
(
k˜N − k˜T
) − δK > 0, (73b)
since we suppose that kN > kT .
We can deduce the signs of several useful expressions:
Y NK = µ (ν2 + δK) > 0, (74a)
Y TK = p˜ν1 < 0, (74b)
p˜hkkk
N
p
µ
= −ν1 > 0, (74c)
Y NτF = k˜
T (ν2 + δK)σLL˜
Λ˜
(1 + τF )
> 0, (74d)
Y TτF = p˜k˜
Nν1σLL˜
Λ˜
(1 + τF )
< 0, (74e)
Y Nλ¯ = −
1
λ¯
σLL˜k˜
Tµ (ν2 + δK) < 0, (74f)
Y Tλ¯ = −
1
λ¯
σLL˜p˜k˜
Nν1 > 0. (74g)
We write out eigenvector ωi, corresponding with stable eigenvalue ν1 with i = 1, 2, to
determine their signs:
ω1 =
 1 (+)ν1−ν2(
Y Np
µ
−cNp
) (−)
 , ω2 = ( 1 (+)
0
)
. (75)
Case kT > kN
This assumption reflects the fact that the capital-labor ratio of the traded good sector
exceeds the capital-labor ratio of the non traded sector. From (68), the stable and unstable
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eigenvalues can be rewritten as follows:
ν1 =
h˜
µ
(
k˜N − k˜T
) − δK < 0, (76a)
ν2 = − f˜
p˜
(
k˜N − k˜T
) > 0, (76b)
since we suppose that kT > kN .
We can deduce the signs of several useful expressions:
Y NK = µ (ν1 + δK) < 0, (77a)
Y TK = p˜ν2 > 0, (77b)
p˜hkkk
N
p
µ
= −ν2 < 0, (77c)
Y NτF = k˜
Tµ (ν1 + δK)σLL˜
Λ˜
(1 + τF )
< 0, (77d)
Y TτF = p˜k˜
Nν2σLL˜
Λ˜
(1 + τF )
> 0, (77e)
Y Nλ¯ = −
1
λ¯
σLL˜k˜
Tµ (ν1 + δK) > 0, (77f)
Y Tλ¯ = −
1
λ¯
σLL˜p˜k˜
Nν2 < 0. (77g)
We write out the four eigenvectors ωi, corresponding with stable eigenvalues νi with i =
1, 2, to determine their signs:
ω1 =
(
1 (+)
0
)
, ω2 =
 0ν2−ν1(
Y Np
µ
−cNp
) (+)
 . (78)
Formal Solution for the Stock of Foreign Assets
We first linearize equation (13j) around the steady-state:
b˙(t) = r?
(
b(t)− b˜
)
+ Y TK
(
K(t)− K˜
)
+
[
Y Tp − cTp
]
(p(t)− p˜) . (79)
where cTp is given by (47b).
Inserting general solutions for K(t) and p(t), the solution for the stock of international
assets writes as follows:
b˙(t) = r?
(
b(t)− b˜
)
+ Y TK
2∑
i=1
Bie
νit +
[
Y Tp − cTp
] 2∑
i=1
Biω
i
2e
νit. (80)
Solving the differential equation leads to the following expression:
b(t)− b˜ =
[(
b0 − b˜
)
− Φ1B1 − Φ2B2
]
er
?t +Φ1B1eν1t +Φ2B2eν2t, (81)
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with
Φi =
Ni
νi − r? =
Y TK +
[
Y Tp − cTp
]
ωi2
νi − r? , i = 1, 2. (82)
Invoking the transversality condition for intertemporal solvency, i. e. equation (14), the
terms in brackets of equation (81) must be null and we must set B2 = 0. We obtain the
linearized version of the nation’s intertemporal budget constraint:
b0 − b˜ = Φ1B1. (83)
The stable solution for net foreign assets finally reduces to:
b(t)− b˜ = Φ1B1. (84)
Inserting the value for the constant B1 given by the stable solution for K(t) by setting
t = 0, we can rewrite the national intertemporal budget constraint as a function of initial
capital stock:
b0 − b˜ = Φ1
(
K0 − K˜
)
. (85)
Case kN > kT
N1 = Y TK +
(
Y Tp − cTp
)
ω12,
= p˜ν2
{
1 +
ω12
p˜ν2
[
σcc˜
N − σLL˜k˜T (ν2 + δK) Λ˜
]}
≷ 0, (86a)
N2 = Y TK +
(
Y Tp − cTp
)
ω22, (86b)
= Y TK = p˜ν1 < 0, (86c)
where (86c) follows from the fact that ω22 = 0. We made use of property (57a) together with the
fact that cTp = pccp−pcNp to compute Y Tp −cTp = −p˜
(
Y Np
µ − cNp
)
−pccp−σLL˜k˜T (ν2 + δK) Λ˜ ≷ 0.
The sign of Φ1 is ambiguous and reflects the impact of the capital accumulation on the
net foreign assets accumulation along a stable transitional path:
b˙(t) = Φ1K˙(t).
where K˙(t) = ν1B1eν1t. Following empirical evidence suggesting that the current account
and investment are negatively correlated (see e. g. Glick and Rogoff [?]), we will impose
thereafter:
Assumption 1 Φ1 < 0 which implies that N1 > 0.
The condition for the assumption to hold, i. e. N1 > 0, may be rewritten as follows:
ν2 > −ω
1
2
p˜
[
σcc˜
N − σLL˜k˜T (ν2 + δK) Λ˜
]
. (87)
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Case kT > kN
N1 = Y TK +
(
Y Tp − cTp
)
ω12,
= Y TK = p˜ν2 > 0, (88a)
N2 = Y TK +
(
Y Tp − cTp
)
ω22,
= p˜ν1
{
1 +
ω22
p˜ν1
[
σcc˜
N − σLL˜k˜T (ν1 + δk) Λ˜
]}
,≶ 0, (88b)
where (88a) follows from the fact that ω12 = 0. We made use of property (57a) together with
cTp = pccp − pcNp to compute Y Tp − cTp = −p˜
(
Y Np
µ − cNp
)
− pccp − σLL˜k˜T (ν1 + δK) ≷ 0.
C Derivation of the Current Account Equation
This section is dedicated to the determination of current account law of motion. Substituting
the definition of transfer Z to households from the government derived from (??) together
with the market clearing condition for non traded goods (13i) into (6) we get:
b˙ = r?b(t) +
(
rK + δK
)
K(t) + wAL(t)− pc (1 + τ c) c(t)− p(t)I(t) + Z,
= r?b+
(
rKK + wFL
)− pcc− p(Y N
µ
− cN − gN
)
.
Using the fact that LT +LN = L, KT +KN = K, , the dynamic equation for the current
account can be rewritten as follows:
b˙ = r?b+
[
wFLT +
(
rK + δK
)
KT
]
+
[
wFLN +
(
rK + δK
)
KN
]− pY N − cT − gT ,
= r?b+ Y T − cT − gT ,
where the overall variable cost wFLN +
(
rK + δK
)
KN in the non traded sector and output
net of fixed cost in that sector, i. e. pY
N
µ = pZ
N , cancel each other.2
D Long-Run Effects of Unanticipated Permanent Tax Shocks
In this section, we calculate formal expressions of steady-state changes. For clarity purpose,
we assume that δK = 0 since it does not modify qualitatively the long-run effects of tax
policies. This assumption will be relaxed in numerical analysis. We totally differentiate the
2In the traded sector which is perfectly competitive, we have : Y T = FLL
T +
(
rK + δK
)
KT = wFLT +(
rK + δK
)
KT . Instead, in the non traded sector which is imperfectly competitive we have: pZN = pHL
µ
LN +
pHK
µ
KN or pµZN = pY N = pHLL
N + pHKK
N = wFLN +
(
rK + δK
)
KN .
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system (22) evaluated at the steady-state which yields in a matrix form:
hkkk
N
p
µ 0 0 0(
Y Np
µ − cNp
)
Y NK
µ
(
Y N
λ¯
µ − cNλ¯
)
0(
Y Tp − cTp
)
Y TK
(
Y T
λ¯
− cT
λ¯
)
r?
0 −Φ1 0 1


dp˜
dK˜
dλ¯
db˜
 =

0
−Y
N
τF
µ dτ
F − Y
N
τH
µ dτ
H + cNτcdτ
c
−Y T
τF
dτF − Y T
τH
dτH + cTτcdτ
c
0

(89)
The determinant denoted by D of the matrix of coefficients is given by:
D ≡ hkkk
N
p
µ
{
Y NK
µ
(
Y Tλ¯ − cTλ¯
)−(Y Nλ¯
µ
− cNλ¯
)[
Y TK + r
?Φ1
]}
(90)
We have to consider two cases, depending on wether the non traded sector is more or less
capital intensive than the traded sector:
D = −ν1ν2
p˜λ¯
(
σLw˜
F L˜+ σcpcc˜
)
> 0, case kT > kN , (91a)
D = −ν1ν2
p˜λ¯
{(
σLw˜
F L˜+ σcpcc˜
)
+
r?
ν2
ω12
ν2
(
σcc˜
N − σLL˜k˜T ν2
)(
σcc˜
N − σLL˜k˜T ν2Λ˜
)}
> 0,(91b)
case kN > kT ,
where we used the fact that and µfkN − phkT = µwF (kN − kT ) together with
−p (kNν2 + kT ν1) ≡ wF if kT > kN or −p (kNν1 + kT ν2) ≡ wF if kN > kT .
Useful Expressions
We have computed these useful expressions:
Y NK
µ
Y Tλ¯ − Y TK
Y N
λ¯
µ
= σL
L˜
λ¯
h˜f˜(
k˜N − k˜T
) , (92a)
p′cY
T
K − (1− αc) pc
Y NK
µ
= −pc
p˜
αcf˜ + (1− αc) p˜h˜(
k˜N − k˜T
)
 , (92b)
Y N
λ¯
µ
− cNλ¯ =
1
λ¯
−σLL˜k˜T h˜(
k˜N − k˜T
) + σcc˜N
 , (92c)
Y TK − cTλ¯ =
p˜
λ¯
σLL˜k˜N f˜
p˜
(
k˜N − k˜T
) + σc c˜T
p˜
 . (92d)
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In the case kN > kT , useful expressions (99) write as follows:
Y NK
µ
Y Tλ¯ − Y TK
Y N
λ¯
µ
= −p˜ν1ν2σLL˜
λ¯
(
k˜N − k˜T
)
> 0, (93a)
p′cY
T
K − (1− αc) pc
Y NK
µ
= −pc [ν2 − αcr?] < 0, (93b)
Y N
λ¯
µ
− cNλ¯ = −
1
λ¯
[
σLL˜k˜
T ν2 − σcc˜N
]
< 0, (93c)
Y Tλ¯ − cTλ¯ = −
1
λ¯
[
σLL˜p˜k˜
Nν1 − σcc˜T
]
> 0, (93d)
Y NK
µ
cTτc − Y TK cNτc =
σcpcc˜
(1 + τ c)
[−ν2 (1− αc) + ν1αc] < 0, (93e)
Y TK
Y N
τF
µ
− Y
N
K
µ
Y TτF = −p˜ν1ν2σLL˜
Λ˜
(1 + τF )
(
k˜N − k˜T
)
> 0, (93f)
Y TK
Y N
τH
µ
− Y
N
K
µ
Y TτH = −p˜ν1ν2σLL˜
(w˜ − κ)
w˜A
(
k˜N − k˜T
)
> 0, (93g)
Y Tp − cTp =
(
σcc˜
N − σLL˜Λ˜k˜T ν2
)
− p˜
(
Y Np
µ
− cNp
)
. (93h)
where we used the fact that Y Tp = −p˜Y
N
p
µ −σLL˜Λ˜k˜T ν2, cTp = pccp− p˜cNp and pccp = −σcc˜N to
rewrite Y Tp − cTp (see (93h)).
In the case kT > kN , useful expressions (99) write as follows:
Y NK
µ
Y Tλ¯ − Y TK
Y N
λ¯
µ
= p˜ν1ν2
σLL˜
λ¯
(
k˜T − k˜N
)
< 0, (94a)
p′cY
T
K − (1− αc) pcY NK = −pc [ν1 − αcr?] > 0, (94b)
Y N
λ¯
µ
− cNλ¯ = −
1
λ¯
(
σLL˜k˜
T ν1 − σcc˜N
)
> 0, (94c)
Y Tλ¯ − cTλ¯ = −
1
λ¯
[
σLL˜p˜k˜
Nν2 − σcc˜T
]
≷ 0, (94d)
Y NK
µ
cTτc − Y TK cNτc =
σcpcc˜
(1 + τ c)
[−ν1 (1− αc) + ν2αc] > 0, (94e)
Y TK
Y N
τF
µ
− Y
N
K
µ
Y TτF = p˜ν1ν2σLL˜
Λ˜
(1 + τF )
(
k˜T − k˜N
)
< 0, (94f)
Y Tp − cTp =
(
σcc˜
N − σLL˜Λ˜k˜T ν1
)
− p˜
(
Y Np
µ
− cNp
)
, (94g)
Y TK + r
?Φ1 = −p˜ν1. (94h)
Long-Run Effects of an Unanticipated Permanent Change in the Consumption
Tax Rate
case kN > kT
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dc˜
dτ c
= −
(
σcc˜σLL˜
∆(1 + τ c)
)[
wF − k˜T r
?
ν2
ω12
(
σcc˜
N − σLL˜kT ν2Λ˜
)]
≶ 0, (95a)
dL˜
dτ c
= −
(
σcpcc˜σLL˜
1 + τ c
)
1
∆
[
1 + αc
r?
ν2
ω12
p˜ν2
(
σcc˜
N − σLL˜kT ν2Λ˜
)]
< 0, (95b)
dλ¯
dτ c
= −
(
σcλ¯pcc˜
1 + τ c
)
1
∆
[
1 + αc
r?
ν2
ω12
p˜ν2
(
σcc˜
N − σLL˜kT ν2Λ˜
)]
< 0, (95c)
dp˜
dτ c
= 0, (95d)
dK˜
dτ c
=
1
ν2
(
1
1 + τ c
)(
σcpcc˜σLL˜
∆
)[
αck˜
Nν1 − (1− αc) k˜T ν2
]
< 0, (95e)
db˜
dτ c
= Φ1
dK˜
dτ c
> 0, (95f)
where ∆ =
[(
σLw˜
F L˜+ σcpcc˜
)
+ r
?
ν2
ω12
ν2
(
σcc˜
N − σLL˜k˜T ν2
)(
σcc˜
N − σLL˜k˜T ν2Λ˜
)]
is assumed
to be positive.
case kT > kN
dc˜
dτ c
= −
(
1
1 + τ c
)(
σcc˜σLw˜
F L˜
σLw˜F L˜+ σcpcc˜
)
< 0, (96a)
dL˜
dτ c
= −
(
1
1 + τ c
)(
σcpcc˜σLL˜
σLw˜F L˜+ σcpcc˜
)
< 0, (96b)
dλ¯
dτ c
= −λ¯
(
1
1 + τ c
)(
σcpcc˜
σLw˜F L˜+ σcpcc˜
)
< 0, (96c)
dp˜
dτ c
= 0, (96d)
dK˜
dτ c
=
1
ν1
(
1
1 + τ c
)(
σcpcc˜σLL˜
σLw˜F L˜+ σcpcc˜
)(
αck˜
Nν2 − (1− αc) k˜T ν1
)
< 0, (96e)
db˜
dτ c
= −p˜dK˜
dτ c
> 0. (96f)
Long-Run Effects of an Unanticipated Permanent Change in the Payroll Tax
Rate
case kN > kT
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dc˜
dτF
= −σcc˜σLL˜∆
Λ˜
(1 + τF )
[
w˜F − k˜T r?ω
1
2
ν2
(
σcc˜
N − σLL˜kT ν2Λ˜
)]
≶ 0, (97a)
dL˜
dτF
= −σLL˜
∆
Λ˜
(1 + τF )
{
σcpcc˜+
r?
ν2
ω12
ν2
(
σcc˜
N − σLL˜kT ν2Λ˜
)
σcc˜
N
}
< 0, (97b)
dλ¯
dτF
= λ¯
σLL˜
∆
Λ˜
(1 + τF )
[
w˜F − k˜T r?ω
1
2
ν2
(
σcc˜
N − σLL˜kT ν2Λ˜
)]
≶ 0, (97c)
dp˜
dτF
= 0, (97d)
dK˜
dτF
=
σLL˜
∆ν2
Λ˜
(1 + τF )
σcpcc˜
[
αck˜
Nν1 − (1− αc) k˜T ν2
]
< 0, (97e)
db˜
dτF
= Φ1
dK˜
dτF
> 0, (97f)
where we used the fact that p˜
(
ν2k˜
T + ν1k˜N
)
= −p˜
(
h˜− hkk˜N
)
≡ −w˜F and LτH =
LτF
(w˜−κ)
w˜A
1+τF
Λ˜
.
case kT > kN
dc˜
dτF
= −σcc˜σLL˜∆
Λ˜
(1 + τF )
w˜F =
1 + τ c
1 + τF
dc˜
dτ c
< 0, (98a)
dL˜
dτF
= −σLL˜
∆
Λ˜
(1 + τF )
σcpcc˜ =
1 + τ c
1 + τF
dL˜
dτ c
< 0, (98b)
dλ¯
dτF
= λ¯
σLL˜
∆
Λ˜
(1 + τF )
w˜F > 0, (98c)
dp˜
dτF
= 0, (98d)
dK˜
dτF
=
σLL˜
ν1∆
Λ˜
(1 + τF )
σcpcc˜
[
αck˜
Nν2 − (1− αc) k˜T ν1
]
< 0, (98e)
db˜
dτF
= −p˜ dK˜
dτF
> 0, (98f)
where we let ∆ ≡ σLw˜F L˜ + σcpcc˜ and we used the fact that −p˜
(
ν1k˜
T + ν2k˜N
)
=
p˜
(
h˜− hkk˜N
)
≡ w˜F .
Long-Run Effects of an Unanticipated Permanent Change in the Wage Income
Tax Rate
case kN > kT
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dc˜
dτH
= −σcc˜σLL˜∆
(w˜ − κ)
w˜A
[
w˜F − k˜T r?ω
1
2
ν2
(
σcc˜
N − σLL˜kT ν2Λ˜
)]
≶ 0, (99a)
dL˜
dτH
= −σLL˜
∆
(w˜ − κ)
w˜A
{
σcpcc˜+
r?
ν2
ω12
ν2
(
σcc˜
N − σLL˜kT ν2Λ˜
)
σcc˜
N
}
< 0, (99b)
dλ¯
dτH
= λ¯
σLL˜
∆
(w˜ − κ)
w˜A
[
w˜F − k˜T r?ω
1
2
ν2
(
σcc˜
N − σLL˜kT ν2Λ˜
)]
≶ 0, (99c)
dp˜
dτH
= 0, (99d)
dK˜
dτH
=
σLL˜
ν2∆
σcpcc˜
(w˜ − κ)
w˜A
)
[
αck˜
Nν1 − (1− αc) k˜T ν2
]
< 0, (99e)
db˜
dτH
= −Φ1 dK˜dτH > 0, (99f)
where we used the fact that
w˜(1−τH)
w˜A
= Λ˜.
case kT > kN
dc˜
dτH
= −σcc˜σLL˜∆
(w˜ − κ)
w˜A
w˜F =
dc˜
dτF
(w˜ − κ)
w˜A
1 + τF
Λ˜
< 0, (100a)
dL˜
dτH
= −σLL˜
∆
(w˜ − κ)
w˜A
σcpcc˜ < 0, (100b)
dλ¯
dτH
= λ¯
σLL˜
∆
(w˜ − κ)
w˜A
w˜F > 0, (100c)
dp˜
dτH
= 0, (100d)
dK˜
dτH
=
σLL˜
ν1∆
(w˜ − κ)
w˜A
σcpcc˜
[
αck˜
Nν2 − (1− αc) k˜T ν1
]
< 0, (100e)
db˜
dτH
= −p˜ dK˜
dτH
> 0, (100f)
where we let ∆ = σLw˜F L˜+ σcpcc˜.
Inelastic Labor Supply Case: σL = 0
If labor is supplied inelastically, then the intertemporal elasticity of substitution for labor
is null and total employment remains fixed to the level L¯ = 1.
Long-Run Effects of an Unanticipated Permanent Change of the Consumption
Tax Rate
Set σL = 0 into (95) or (96), we get:
dc˜
dτ c
=
dL˜
dτ c
=
dp˜
dτ c
=
dK˜
dτ c
=
db˜
dτ c
= 0, (101a)
dλ¯
dτ c
= − λ¯
(1 + τ c)
. (101b)
From (101a)-(101b), the elasticity of the marginal utility of wealth is equal to unity in absolute
terms and the long-run levels of variables remain unaffected. A rise in consumption tax raises
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the marginal cost of current consumption. Since the trade-off between labor and leisure
turns out to be irrelevant, total employment remains fixed such that λ¯ must fall by the same
proportion than the rise in τ c thus leaving unaffected real consumption as the direct effect
and the wealth effect cancel each other. Since demand for non tradables and tradables remain
unaffected, capital stock and net foreign assets must not change for investment and the current
account to be zero in the long-run. As the capital stock remains unchanged in the long-run,
dynamics degenerate.
Long-Run Effects of an Unanticipated Permanent Change of the Payroll Tax
Rate
Set σL = 0 into (97) or (98), we get:
dc˜
dτF
=
dL˜
dτF
=
dλ¯
dτF
=
dp˜
dτF
=
dK˜
dτF
=
db˜
dτF
= 0, (102a)
dw˜
dτF
= − w˜
(1 + τF )
< 0. (102b)
From (102a)-(102b), a fall in τF leaves unchanged the steady-state levels of variables, and
more importantly does no longer induce a wealth effect. The explanation is that whenever
the trade-off between labor and leisure turns out to be irrelevant, total employment remains
fixed. To insure that equality of sectoral labor marginal products holds, the wage must rise by
the same proportion than the fall in the payroll tax. As the capital stock remains unchanged
in the long-run, dynamics degenerate. In words, if labor is fixed, a change in the tax on wage
paid by producers induces solely a direct effect on the wage rate.
E The Two-Step Procedure: the Wealth Effect and the Direct
Effects
By analytical convenience, we rewrite the system of steady-state equations (22), assuming
that δK = 0:
hk
[
kN (p˜)
]
µ
= r?, (103a)
1
µ
Y N
(
K˜, p˜, λ¯, τF , τH
)
− cN (λ¯, p˜, τ c)− gN = 0, (103b)
r?b˜+ Y T
(
K˜, p˜, λ¯, τF , τH
)
− cT (λ¯, p˜, τ c)− gT = 0, (103c)
together with the intertemporal solvency condition(
b˜− b0
)
= Φ1
(
K˜ −K0
)
. (103d)
where K0 and b0 correspond to the initially predetermined stocks of physical capital and
foreign assets, the open economy starting from an initial steady-state at time T . If the fiscal
shock is permanent, then T = 0.
Derivation of Steady-State Functions
46
The new consistent procedure consists in two steps. In a first step, we solve the system
(103a)-(103c) for p˜, K˜ and b˜ as functions of the marginal utility of wealth, λ¯, the tax rates on
consumption and labor together with the mark-up. Totally differentiating equations (103a)-
(103c) yields in matrix form:
hkkk
N
p 0 0(
Y Np
µ − cNp
)
Y NK
µ 0(
Y Tp − cTp
)
Y TK r
?

 dp˜dK˜
db˜
 =
=

0
−
(
Y N
λ¯
µ − cNλ¯
)
dλ¯+ cNτcdτ
c − Y
N
τF
µ dτ
F − Y
N
τH
µ dτ
H
− (Y T
λ¯
− cT
λ¯
)
dλ¯+ cTτcdτ
c − Y T
τF
dτF − Y T
τH
dτH
 . (104)
The equilibrium value of the marginal utility of wealth λ¯ and tax rates, τ c, τF , τH deter-
mine the following steady-state values:
K˜ = K
(
λ¯, τ c, τF , τH
)
, (105a)
b˜ = v
(
λ¯, τ c, τF , τH
)
, (105b)
with partial derivatives given by:
Kλ¯ ≡
∂K˜
∂λ¯
= − 1
λ¯
1
ν1
(
σcc˜
N − σLL˜k˜T ν1
)
> 0 case kT > kN , (106a)
= − 1
λ¯
1
ν2
(
σcc˜
N − σLL˜k˜T ν2
)
> 0 case kN > kT , (106b)
vλ¯ ≡
∂b˜
∂λ¯
= − 1
λ¯
1
r?h˜
[
σc
(
f˜ c˜N + h˜c˜T
)
+ σLL˜h˜f˜
]
< 0, (106c)
and
Kτc ≡ ∂K˜
∂τ c
= − 1
ν1
(
σcc˜
N
1 + τ c
)
> 0 case kT > kN , (107a)
= − 1
ν2
(
σcc˜
N
1 + τ c
)
< 0 case kN > kT , (107b)
vτc ≡ ∂b˜
∂τ c
= − 1
r?h˜
(
σc
1 + τ c
)(
f˜ c˜N + h˜c˜T
)
< 0, (107c)
and
KτF ≡
∂K˜
∂τF
= − σLL˜
1 + τF
k˜T < 0, (108a)
vτF ≡
∂b˜
∂τF
=
f˜
r?
σLL˜
1 + τF
> 0. (108b)
Since real consumption and labor supply turn to be affected by the change in the capital
income tax rate through the steady-state change of the real exchange rate, it is convenient to
write their steady-state functions
c = m
(
λ¯, τ c,
)
, L = n
(
λ¯, τF , τH ,
)
, (109)
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where partial derivatives are given by (45) evaluated at the steady-state (that’s why we
substitute respectively the notations m and n for c and L).
Derivation of the Equilibrium Value of the Marginal Utility of Wealth
The second step consists to determine the equilibrium change of λ¯ by taking the total
differential of the intertemporal solvency condition (103d):
[vλ¯ − Φ1Kλ] dλ¯ = − [vτc − Φ1Kτc ] dτ c − [vτF − Φ1KτF ] dτF − [vτH − Φ1KτH ] dτH , (110)
from which may solve for the equilibrium value of λ¯ as a function of tax rates:
λ¯ = λ
(
τ c, τF , τH
)
, (111)
with
λτc ≡ ∂λ¯
∂τ c
= − [vτc − Φ1Kτc ]
[vλ¯ − Φ1Kλ¯]
, (112a)
λτF ≡
∂λ¯
∂τF
= − [vτF − Φ1KτF ]
[vλ¯ − Φ1Kλ¯]
, (112b)
λτH ≡
∂λ¯
∂τH
= − [vτH − Φ1KτH ]
[vλ¯ − Φ1Kλ¯]
. (112c)
F Overall Effect of a Tax Reform
We first substitute short-run static solutions for consumption, wage and labor given by (??)
and (16), into the balanced government budget constraint (12) evaluated at the steady-state:
τ cpc (p˜) c
(
λ¯, p˜, τ c
)
+
[(
τF + τH
)
w
(
p˜, τF
)− τHκ]L (λ¯, p˜, τF , τH) = Z, (113)
keeping in mind that the long-run value of the real exchange rate is unaffected by fiscal tax
changes and λ¯ = λ
(
τ c, τF , τH
)
.
F.1 Steady-State Changes of a Tax Reform: Substitution of Payroll Taxes
for Consumption Taxes
In this section, we estimate the long-run effects of a fall in the payroll tax τF associated with a
rise in the consumption tax rate τ c, which is adjusted accordingly to balance the government
budget. Additionally, we assume that taxes on labor income are progressive so that κ > 0
and Λ < 1. To avoid confusion, we denote by
∣∣j,c the effects of the tax reform which involves
simultaneously cutting the tax j = F and increasing the tax k = c so that as to leave balanced
the government budget condition. In brief, the tax reform strategy involves simultaneously
cutting the payroll tax by dτF < 0 and increasing the tax on consumption goods dτ c|F,c > 0.
Holding τH constant, we differentiate (113)
pcc˜+ τ cpcdc˜
∣∣F,c + [(τF + τH)wτF + w˜]dτF + (w˜F − w˜A) dL˜∣∣F,c = 0, (114)
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with
[(
τF + τH
)
wτF + w˜
]
= w˜
(
1−τH
1+τF
)
> 0.
By using the fact that dx˜
∣∣F,c = dx˜dτF dτF + dx˜dτcdτ c∣∣F,c, and by rearranging terms, we can
determine the size of the rise in the consumption tax rate τ c
∣∣F,c after a fall in the payroll tax
τF such that the governement budget constraint (113) remains balanced:
dτ c
∣∣F,c = −χF
χc
dτH = −
τ
cpc
dc˜
dτF +
(
w˜F − w˜A) dL˜dτF + (1−τH1+τF ) w˜L˜
τ cpc
dc˜
dτc + (w˜
F − w˜A) dL˜dτc + pcc˜
 dτF , (115)
where the signs of χF and χc will be estimated later.
case kN > kT
If the non traded sector is relatively more capital intensive than the traded sector, the
long-run changes are given by:
dλ¯
∣∣F,c = λτF dτF + λτcdτ c∣∣F,c,
=
λ¯
χc
pcc˜
∆
{
χF
1 + τ c
σc
(
1 +
σLw˜
F L˜
σcpcc˜
)
+ σLw˜F L˜
Λ˜
1 + τF
(
1− w˜
AL˜
pc (1 + τ c) c˜
)}
dτF
+
λ¯
χc∆
ω12
ν2
r?
ν2
(
σcc˜
N − σLL˜kT ν2Λ˜
)[ χF
1 + τ c
(
σcc˜
N − σLL˜kT ν2
)
− σLL˜kT ν2 Λ˜1 + τF pcc˜
(
1− w˜
AL˜
pc (1 + τ c) c˜
)]
dτF < 0, (116a)
dx˜
∣∣F,c = ∂x˜
∂τF
dτF +
∂x˜
∂τ c
dτ c
∣∣F,c
=
∂x˜
∂τF
pcc˜
χc
[
1− w˜
AL˜
pcc˜ (1 + τ c)
]
dτF > 0, (116b)
where x = c,K,L, b. To determine (116b), we used the fact that ∂x˜∂τc =
∂x˜
∂τF
1+τF
1+τc
1
Λ˜
and
substituted (115), by remembering that χc = 1+τ
F
1+τc
1
Λ˜
[
χF − Λ˜1+τF w˜AL˜
]
+ pcc˜.
We estimated χc and χF in the case kN > kT as follows:
χc = τ cpc
dc˜
dτ c
+
(
w˜F − w˜A) dL˜
dτ c
+ pcc˜
=
w˜F L˜pcc˜
(1 + τ c)∆
{
σc (1 + τ c)
(
pcc˜
w˜F L˜
− σL τ
c
1 + τ c
)
+ σL
[
(1 + τ c)− σcτA
]}
− (1 + τ c) ω
1
2
ν2
r?
ν2
(
σcc˜
N − σLL˜kT ν2Λ˜
)
{
σLL˜k
T ν2Λ˜
(
1 + σL
τ c
1 + τ c
)
− σcc˜N
(
1 + σL
w˜F L˜
pc (1 + τ c) c˜
τA
)}
> 0, (117a)
χF = τ cpc
dc˜
dτF
+
(
w˜F − w˜A) dL˜
dτF
+
(
Λ˜
1 + τF
)
w˜AL˜. (117b)
While the sign of χc is positive, we are unable to determine the sign of χF . However, since it
is reasonable to suppose that a rise in the consumption tax rate is required after a fall in the
payroll tax rate for the government budget to be balanced, we assume that χF > 0.
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case kT > kN
If the traded sector is relatively more capital intensive than the non traded sector, the
long-run changes are given by:
dλ¯
∣∣F,c = λτF dτF + λτcdτ c∣∣F,c,
=
λτF
χc
{
1 + τF
1 + τ c
χF
Λ˜
(
1 +
σcpcc˜
σLw˜F L˜
)
+ pcc˜
(
1− w˜
AL˜
pcc˜ (1 + τ c)
)}
dτF < 0,(118a)
dc˜
∣∣F,c = ∂x˜
∂τF
dτF +
∂x˜
∂τ c
dτ cλτcdτ c
∣∣F,c
=
∂x˜
∂τF
pcc˜
χc
[
1− w˜
AL˜
pcc˜ (1 + τ c)
]
dτF > 0, (118b)
where x = c,K,L, b. To derive (118a), we made use of the fact that λτc = −λτF σcpcc˜σLw˜F L˜
1
Λ˜
1+τF
1+τc .
To determine (118b), we used the fact that ∂x˜∂τc =
∂x˜
∂τF
1+τF
1+τc
1
Λ˜
and substituted (115), by
remembering that χc = 1+τ
F
1+τc
1
Λ˜
[
χF − Λ˜1+τF w˜AL˜
]
+pcc˜. It is interesting to notice that the fall
in the marginal utility of wealth following a rise in τ c is strengthened by its decrease after a
reduction in τF .
We estimated χc and χF in the case kT > kN as follows:
χc = τ cpc
dc˜
dτ c
+
(
w˜F − w˜A) dL˜
dτ c
+ pcc˜
=
w˜F L˜pcc˜
(1 + τ c)∆
{
σc (1 + τ c)
(
pcc˜
w˜F L˜
− σL τ
c
1 + τ c
)
+ σL
[
(1 + τ c)− σcτA
]}
> 0, (119a)
χF = τ cpc
dc˜
dτF
+
(
w˜F − w˜A) dL˜
dτF
+
(
1− τH
1 + τF
)
w˜L˜ (119b)
=
w˜F L˜pcc˜
∆
Λ˜
1 + τF
{
σc
(
w˜A
w˜F
− σcτ c
)
+ σL
(
w˜AL˜
pcc˜
− σcτA
)}
≷ 0, (119c)
The term χc captures two conflictory effects induced by a rise in the consumption tax rate on
public revenue. For given levels of real consumption and employment, the increased consump-
tion tax rate raises fiscal earnings as it is reflected by the third term on the RHS of (119a)
(first line). However, by increasing the consumption tax rate, households are induced to re-
duce both their real consumption and their labor supply. Inspection of (119a) (second line)
shows that the first term in braces is positive since pcc˜
w˜F L˜
> 1 as longer as a˜ > 0 and because
τc
1+τc is very small (the average value of the consumption tax rate for 13 OECD countries
is approximately 10%). The second term of (119a) (second line) is also positive since σc is
lower than unity according to empirical evidence and 0 < τA < 1. Consequently, according to
(119a), χc > 0; in brief, the decrease in the tax bases via lower consumption and employment
is not large enough to more than outweigh the positive tax rate effect.
The sign of χF is unclear. Inspection of (119c) shows that the signs of the two terms
in braces are ambiguous: [i] because w˜
A
w˜F
< 1 and σLτ c < 1, and since [ii] w˜
AL˜
pcc˜
< 1 and
σcτ
A < 1. However, we may reasonably expect that a fall in the payroll tax, i. e. dτF < 0,
does not pay for itself so that the rise in the tax bases via higher consumption and higher
employment, is not large enough to offset the negative public revenue effect originating from
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the cut of the labor income tax rate dτF . Consequently, we may assume that χF > 0 so that
the consumption tax rate must rise for the government balanced budget to hold.
F.2 Steady-State Changes of a Tax Reform: Substitution of labor income
Taxes for Consumption Taxes
In this section, we estimate the long-run effects of a fall in the labor income tax τH associated
with a rise in the consumption tax rate τ c, which is adjusted accordingly to balance the
government budget. Additionally, we assume that taxes on labor income are progressive so
that κ > 0 and Λ < 1. To avoid confusion, we denote by
∣∣j,c the effects of the tax reform
which involves simultaneously cutting the tax j = H and increasing the tax k = c so that
as to to leave balanced the government budget condition. In brief, the tax reform strategy
involves simultaneously cutting the labor income tax by dτH < 0 and increasing the tax on
consumption goods dτ c|F,c > 0.
Differentiate (113) by letting τF constant, we can derive the size of the rise in the con-
sumption tax rate:
dτ c
∣∣H,c = −χH
χc
dτH = −
τ
cpc
dc˜
dτH +
(
w˜F − w˜A) dL˜dτH + (w˜ − κ) L˜
τ cpc
dc˜
dτc + (w˜
F − w˜A) dL˜dτc + pcc˜
dτH . (120)
Making use of long-term effects of permanent changes in τH and τ c and substituting dτ c
∣∣H,c
given by (120), we are able to estimate the directions and the sizes of the long-run changes
of main economic variables after a fall in τH associated with a rise in τ c by an amount that
leaves balanced the government budget constraint. As it is formally shown below, long-run
changes are not qualitatively sensitive to sectoral capital-labor ratios. Instead, their magni-
tude depends on the steady-state variations after a fall in τF . Hence, the beneficial effects
of a fiscal reform will be sensitive to sectoral capital intensities due to the feed-back effect or
“secondary effect” originating from the real exchange rate dynamics over the transition.
case kN > kT
If the non traded sector is relatively more capital intensive than the traded sector, the
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long-run changes are given by:
dλ¯
∣∣H,c = λτHdτH + λτcdτ c∣∣H,c,
=
λ¯
χc
pcc˜
∆
{
χH
1 + τ c
σc
(
1 +
σLw˜
F L˜
σcpcc˜
)
+ σLw˜F L˜
(
w˜ − κ
w˜
)(
1− w˜
AL˜
pc (1 + τ c) c˜
)}
dτH
+
λ¯
χc∆
ω12
ν2
r?
ν2
(
σcc˜
N − σLL˜kT ν2Λ˜
)[ χH
1 + τ c
(
σcc˜
N − σLL˜kT ν2
)
− σLL˜kT ν2
(
w˜ − κ
w˜
)
pcc˜
(
1− w˜
AL˜
pc (1 + τ c) c˜
)]
dτH > 0, (121a)
dx˜
∣∣H,c = ∂x˜
∂τH
dτH +
∂x˜
∂τ c
dτ c
∣∣H,c
=
∂x˜
∂τH
pcc˜
χc
[
1− w˜
AL˜
pcc˜ (1 + τ c)
]
dτH , (121b)
where x = c,K,L, b. To determine (121b), we used the fact that ∂x˜∂τc =
∂x˜
∂τH
1
1+τc
(
w˜A
w˜−κ
)
and
substituted (120), by remembering that χc = 11+τc
(
w˜A
w˜−κ
) [
χH − (w˜ − κ) L˜
]
+ pcc˜.
We estimated χc and χH in the case kN > kT as follows:
χc = τ cpc
dc˜
dτ c
+
(
w˜F − w˜A) dL˜
dτ c
+ pcc˜
=
w˜F L˜pcc˜
(1 + τ c)∆
{
σc (1 + τ c)
(
pcc˜
w˜F L˜
− σL τ
c
1 + τ c
)
+ σL
[
(1 + τ c)− σcτA
]}
+ (1 + τ c)
ω12
ν2
r?
ν2
(
σcc˜
N − σLL˜kT ν2Λ˜
)
{
− σLL˜kT ν2Λ˜
(
1 + σL
τ c
1 + τ c
)
+ σcc˜N
(
1 + σL
w˜F L˜
pc (1 + τ c) c˜
τA
)}
> 0,(122a)
χH = τ cpc
dc˜
dτH
+
(
w˜F − w˜A) dL˜
dτH
+ (w˜ − κ) L˜ > 0. (122b)
While the sign of χc is positive, we are unable to determine the sign of χH . However, since it
is reasonable to suppose that a rise in the consumption tax rate is required after a fall in the
labor income tax rate for the government budget to be balanced, we assume that χH > 0.
case kT > kN
If the traded sector is relatively more capital intensive than the non traded sector, the
long-run changes are given by:
dλ¯
∣∣H,c = λτHdτH + λτcdτ c∣∣H,c,
=
λτH
χc
{
χH
1 + τ c
(
w˜A
w˜ − κ
)(
1 +
σcpcc˜
σLw˜F L˜
)
+ pcc˜
(
1− w˜
AL˜
pcc˜ (1 + τ c)
)}
dτH < 0,(123a)
dx˜
∣∣H,c = ∂x˜
∂τH
dτH +
∂x˜
∂τ c
dτ c
∣∣H,c
=
∂x˜
∂τH
pcc˜
χc
[
1− w˜
AL˜
pcc˜ (1 + τ c)
]
dτH , (123b)
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where x = c,K,L, b. To derive (123a), we made use of the fact that λτc = −λτH σcpcc˜σLw˜F L˜
w˜A
(w˜−κ) .
To determine (123b), we used the fact that ∂x˜∂τc =
∂x˜
∂τH
1
1+τc
(
w˜A
w˜−κ
)
and substituted (120), by
remembering that χc = 11+τc
(
w˜A
w˜−κ
) [
χH − (w˜ − κ) L˜
]
+ pcc˜. It is interesting to notice that
the fall in the marginal utility of wealth following a rise in τ c is strengthened by its decrease
after a reduction in τH .
We estimated χc and χH in the case kT > kN as follows:
χc = τ cpc
dc˜
dτ c
+
(
w˜F − w˜A) dL˜
dτ c
+ pcc˜
=
w˜F L˜pcc˜
(1 + τ c)∆
{
σc (1 + τ c)
(
pcc˜
w˜F L˜
− σL τ
c
1 + τ c
)
+ σL
[
(1 + τ c)− σcτA
]}
> 0, (124a)
χH = τ cpc
dc˜
dτH
+
(
w˜F − w˜A) dL˜
dτH
+ (w˜ − κ) L˜
=
w˜F L˜pcc˜
∆
(
w˜ − κ
w˜A
){
σc
(
w˜A
w˜F
− σLτ c
)
+ σL
(
w˜AL˜
pcc˜
− σcτA
)}
≷ 0, (124b)
The term χc captures two conflictory effects induced by a rise in the consumption tax rate on
public revenue. For given levels of real consumption and employment, the increased consump-
tion tax rate raises fiscal earnings as it is reflected by the third term on the RHS of (124a)
(first line). However, by increasing the consumption tax rate, households are induced to re-
duce both their real consumption and their labor supply. Inspection of (124a) (second line)
shows that the first term in braces is positive since pcc˜
w˜F L˜
> 1 as longer as a˜ > 0 and because
τc
1+τc is very small (the average value of the consumption tax rate for 13 OECD countries
is approximately 10%). The second term of (124a) (second line) is also positive since σc is
lower than unity according to empirical evidence and 0 < τA < 1. Consequently, according to
(124a), χc > 0; in brief, the decrease in the tax bases via lower consumption and employment
is not large enough to more than outweigh the positive tax rate effect.
The sign of χH is unclear. Inspection of (124b) shows that the signs of the two terms in
braces are ambiguous: [i] because w˜
A
w˜F
< 1 and σLτ c < 1, and since [ii] w˜
AL˜
pcc˜
< 1 and σcτA < 1.
However, we may reasonably expect that a fall in the labor income tax rate dτH < 0 does not
pay itself so that the rise in the tax bases via higher consumption and higher employment,
is not large enough to offset the negative public revenue effect originating from the cut of
the labor income tax rate dτH . Consequently, we may assume that χH > 0 so that the
consumption tax rate must rise for the government balanced budget to hold.
G Dynamic Effects of a Tax Reform
This section estimates the dynamic effects of a tax restructuring. Steady-state changes are
those derived into the previous section where we estimated the long-run variations such that
the rise in τ c guarantees that the balanced condition for the government holds. In addition,
we consider that the change of the tax scheme can be viewed as an unanticipated permanent
tax shock, i. e. in the two first tax reforms we considered, the labor and the consumption tax
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rates are changed simultaneously so as the government budget balanced condition is met and
in the third tax reform, the payroll and the labor income tax rates are changes simultaneously
so as to leave unchanged the marginal tax wedge.
The stable adjustment of the economy is described by a saddle-path in (K, p)-space. The
capital stock, the real exchange rate, and the stock of traded bonds evolve according to:
K(t) = K˜ +B1eν1t, (125a)
p(t) = p˜+ ω12B1e
ν1t, (125b)
b(t) = b˜+Φ1B1eν1t, (125c)
where ω12 = 0 if k
T > kN and with
B1 = K0 − K˜ = −dK˜
∣∣j,k,
where we made use of the constancy of K at time t = 0 (i. e. K0 is predetermined).
G.1 A Permanent Rise in the Consumption Tax Rate
case kN > kT
Using the fact that the steady-state value of the real exchange rate remains unaffected
by the change of the consumption tax rate, the initial reaction of the relative price of non
tradables is given by:
dp(0)
dτ c
= −ω12d
dK˜
dτ c
< 0, (126)
where ω12 < 0 and the long-run change of the capital stock is given by (95e).
Regarding the initial reaction of real consumption, evaluating first at time t = 0 and
differentiating the short-run static solution for real consumption (44) w. r. t. τ c leads to:
dc(0)
dτ c
= cλ¯
dλ¯
dτ c
+ cp
dp(0)
dτ c
+ cτc ,
= − σcc˜σLL˜
∆(1 + τ c)
{
w˜F
(
1 + αcσc
c˜N
p˜
ω12
ν2
)
− k˜T ω
1
2
ν2
(
σcc˜
Nν1 − r?σLL˜k˜T ν2
)}
≶ 0.
Regarding the initial reaction of employment, evaluating first at time t = 0 and differen-
tiating the short-run static solution for labor supply (44) w. r. t. τ c leads to:
dL(0)
dτ c
= Lλ¯
dλ¯
dτ c
+ Lp
dp(0)
dτ c
≶ 0, (127)
with Lp = −σL L˜w˜ k˜
T
(1+τF )
ν2 < 0.
Differentiating solutions (125) with respect to time, we are able to compute the directions
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of trajectories:
K˙(t) = I(t) = −ν1dK˜dτ c e
ν1tdτ c < 0, (128a)
p˙(t) = −ν1ω12
dK˜
dτ c
eν1tdτ c = ω12I(t) > 0, (128b)
b˙(t) = −ν1Φ1dK˜dτ c e
ν1tdτ c = Φ1I(t) > 0, (128c)
with Φ1 < 0 and dK˜dτc < 0.
case kT > kN
With the reversal of capital intensities, both real consumption and total employment fall
immediately to their new lower long-run levels. Over the transition, the negative investment
flow is exactly matched by a current account surplus, thus leaving unchanged savings.
G.2 A Permanent Fall in the Payroll Tax Rate
case kN > kT
Regarding the initial reaction of real consumption, evaluating first at time t = 0 and
differentiating the short-run static solution for real consumption (44) w. r. t. τF leads to:
dc(0)
dτF
= cλ¯
dλ¯
dτF
+ cp
dp(0)
dτF
,
= − σcc˜σLL˜
∆(1 + τF )
{
w˜F
(
1 + αcσc
c˜N
p˜
ω12
ν2
)
− k˜T ω
1
2
ν2
(
σcc˜
Nν1 − r?σLL˜k˜T ν2
)}
≶ 0.(129)
Regarding the initial reaction of employment, evaluating first at time t = 0 and differen-
tiating the short-run static solution for labor supply (44) w. r. t. τF leads to:
dL(0)
dτF
= Lλ¯
dλ¯
dτF
+ Lp
dp(0)
dτF
+ LτF ≶ 0. (130)
case kT > kN
With the reversal of capital intensities, both real consumption and total employment reach
immediately to their new higher long-run levels. Over the transition, the positive investment
flow is exactly matched by a current account deficit, thus leaving unchanged savings.
G.3 Dynamic Effects of a Tax Restructuring
First, it is convenient to introduce some notations. We index by the superscript j the impact
and steady-state effects induced by a fiscal reform strategy which involves simultaneous cutting
the labor tax dτ j (i e. j = F if the payroll tax is reduced or j = H if the labor income tax
is lowered) and increasing the tax rate by dτk (k = c,H). While the two first tax reform
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strategies involves a rise in the consumption tax rate by dτ c|j,c > 0 (so as to leave balanced
the government budget constraint), the third tax reform strategy involves an increase in the
labor income tax rate by dtauH |F,H > 0 (so as to leave unchanged the marginal tax wedge
τM ).
This leads to long-run changes which can be written as follows:
dx˜
∣∣j,k = dx˜
dτ j
Φj,kdτ j , j = F,H, k = c,H, (131)
where x = c, L,K and we denoted by 0 < Φj,k < 1 the scaled-down term of the long-run
change after a fall in the labor tax (j = F,H). In addition, we denote by Υj the positive
term:
ΥF =
Λ˜
1 + τF
> 0, ΥH = w˜ − κ > 0, (132)
with ΥF = 1
1+τF
and ΥH = 1 if κ = 0.
case kN > kT
Using the fact that the steady-state value of the real exchange rate remains unaffected by
a tax restructuring, the initial jump of p is formally given by:
dp(0)
∣∣j,k = −ω12dK˜∣∣j,k > 0, (133)
where the long-run change of the capital stock is given by (131) (set x = K). From the
short-run static solution for real consumption (44), the substitution of its long-run change
(131) (set x = c) together with the initial jump of the real exchange rate (133), the initial
reaction of real consumption is given by:
dc(0)
∣∣j,k = dc˜∣∣j,k + cpdp(0)∣∣j,k = [ dc˜dτ j − cpω12 dK˜dτ j
]
Φj,kdτ j ,
= −σcc˜σLL˜
∆
Υj
{
w˜F
(
1 + αcσc
c˜N
p˜
ω12
ν2
)
− r?k˜T ω
1
2
ν2
(
σcc˜
Nν1 − σLL˜k˜T ν2
)}
Φj,kdτ j ≷ 0, (134)
where we used the fact that cp = −σcαc c˜p˜ < 0, Υj > 0 (see (132)),
(
1 + αcσc c˜
N
p˜
ω12
ν2
)
> 0
(see (87) by setting σL = 0) and dτ j < 0 since we considered a fiscal reform strategy which
simultaneously involves cutting labor tax and raising the consumption tax rate so as to leave
balanced the government budget constraint; in addition, ∆ > 0.
By applying a similar procedure to labor, we can derive its reaction once the fiscal reform
is implemented, i. e. at time t = 0:
dL(0)
∣∣j,k = dL˜∣∣j,k + Lpdp(0)∣∣j,k = [ dL˜dτ j − Lpω12 dK˜dτ j
]
Φj,kdτ j ,
= −σLL˜
∆
Υj
{
σcpcc˜+
ω12
ν2
[
σLL˜Λ˜k˜T ν2σc
(
c˜N +
pcc˜
w˜F L˜
L˜k˜T ν2
)
+
r?
ν2
(
σcc˜
N − σLL˜k˜T ν2Λ˜
)
σcc˜
N
]}
Φj,kdτ j ≷ 0, (135)
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where ∆ > 0, dτ j < 0, and we used the fact that Lp = −σLL˜Λ˜k˜T ν2w˜F < 0, Υj > 0 (see (132)).
Differentiating solutions (125) with respect to time, we are able to compute the directions
of trajectories:
K˙(t) = I(t) = −ν1dK˜
∣∣j,keν1t > 0, (136a)
p˙(t) = −ν1ω12dK˜
∣∣j,keν1t = ω12I(t) < 0, (136b)
b˙(t) = −ν1Φ1dK˜
∣∣j,keν1t = Φ1I(t) < 0, (136c)
with Φ1 < 0 and dK˜
∣∣j,k > 0.
Regarding consumption and labor supply behavior, their trajectories can be computed
by linearizing their short-run static solutions in the neighborhood of the steady-state and
differentiating these with respect to time:
c˙(t) = cpp˙(t) > 0, L˙(t) = Lpp˙(t) > 0, (137)
with cp < 0 and Lp < 0. From impact and steady-state effects, their rising temporal profiles
imply that if they rise in the short-run, their initial upward jumps display a smaller size than
the size of their long-run changes.
case kT > kN
Since the real exchange rate remains unaffected by the fiscal shock in the short-run, real
consumption and labor jump immediately to their new higher steady-state levels.
Differentiating solutions (125) with respect to time, we are able to compute the directions
of trajectories:
K˙(t) = I(t) = −ν1dK˜
∣∣j,keν1t > 0, (138a)
p˙(t) = 0, (138b)
b˙(t) = −ν1Φ1dK˜
∣∣j,keν1t = Φ1I(t) < 0. (138c)
H Tax Wedge
In line with general practice, payroll taxes are assumed to be proportional and wage income
taxes are taken to be progressive. Following Heijdra and Lightart [2008], we define the av-
erage tax wedge as the difference between the producer wage (paid by the firm) and the
purchasing power on consumption goods of after-tax average wage expressed as a percentage
of the wage including payroll taxes:
τA ≡ wL
(
1 + τF
)− [(1− τH)w + τHκ]L
wFL
,
≡ 1−
[(
1− τH)+ τHκw ]
(1 + τF )
(139)
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where wF = w
(
1 + τF
)
. In addition, we denote by τM the marginal tax wedge as the
difference between the producer wage (paid by the firm) and the after-tax marginal wage
expressed as a percentage of the producer cost (i. e. including payroll taxes):
τM ≡ wL
(
1 + τF
)− wL (1− τH)
wFL
,
≡ 1−
(
1− τH)
(1 + τF )
. (140)
The closer to unity τM , the larger the gap between the wage paid by firms and the real wage
received by households.
Using the definition of τM given by (140), we can rewrite the average tax wedge as follows:
τA ≡ τM − τ
Hκ
wF
. (141)
Finally, we provide a measure of the degree of tax progressiveness by the means of the coeffi-
cient of average tax progression:
Γ
(
τF , τH , κ, p
) ≡ τM − τA = τHκ
wF
, (142)
where wF = w
(
1 + τF
)
with w = w
(
τF , p
)
.
As the average tax burden τA rises with wage rate, the system tax is progressive such
that Γ (.) > 0 which holds as longer as κ > 0. It is worth emphasizing that our approach
which consists to define the average tax together with the marginal tax wedge by taking into
account the wage paid by the firm allows for “scaling” the tax burden faced by households in
terms of firms’ labor cost, the index of average tax progression being expressed in terms of
consumption goods; that’s why we use the “wedge” label. By abstracting from this “scaling”
approach, we would define the marginal and average tax wedges together with the coefficient
of average tax progression as follows : τM ≡ τHw, τA ≡ τH (w − κ) and Γ ≡ τHκ > 0 (as
longer as κ > 0).
I Labor Tax Reform: A Fall in Payroll Taxes and a Rise in
Labor Income Taxes
In this section, we consider a labor tax strategy which involves simultaneously cutting a payroll
tax by dτF < 0 and increasing the labor income tax by dτH > 0 so as to leave unchanged the
marginal tax wedge, i. e. dτM = 0. By making use of (140), the labor tax reform strategy
requires a rise in the wage income tax by the following amount:
dτH
∣∣F,H ≡ −θdτF , θ ≡ 1− τH
1 + τF
< 1. (143)
From (143), the income wage tax must be increased by a smaller amount than the fall in tauF
for leaving unchanged the marginal tax wedge. Because we assumed initial positive payroll
taxes so that the denominator of (140) is higher than unity, the fiscal reform keeping the
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marginal tax wedge constant does not yield to a change in τH by the same proportion than
the fall in τF .
Substituting the static solution for the wage rate (50) that holds in the long-run, and
differentiating the coefficient of average tax progression (142) w. r. t. τH and τF , and the
using (143), we find that the fiscal reform raises the degree of average tax progression :
dΓ = − κ
wF
θdτF > 0, (144)
where dτF < 0 since we considered a fall in payroll taxes. The explanation comes from the
fact that the wage rate is raised by the same proportion than the fall in τF . Consequently,
as longer as κ > 0, the rise in τH leads to an increase in Γ.
Making use of long-term effects of permanent changes in τF and τH and substituting
dτH
∣∣F,H given by (143), we are able to estimate the directions and the sizes of the long-run
changes of main economic variables after a fall in τF associated with a rise in τH by an amount
that leaves unaffected τM .
case kN > kT
If the non traded sector is relatively more capital intensive than the traded sector, the
long-run changes are given by:
dλ¯
∣∣F,H = λτHdτH ∣∣F,H + λτF dτF ,
=
dλ¯
dτF
κ
Λ˜
(
1− τH)
w˜A
dτF =
dλ¯
dτF
κ
w˜
dτF , (145a)
dx˜
∣∣F,H = ∂x˜
∂τH
dτH
∣∣F,H + ∂x˜
∂τF
dτF
=
∂x˜
∂τF
[
1− θ (w˜ − κ)
(
1 + τF
)
w˜ (1− τH)
]
dτF =
dx˜
dτF
κ
w˜
dτF , (145b)
(145c)
where x = c,K,L, b and we used the fact that ∂x˜
∂τH
=
(w˜−κ)(1+τF )
w˜(1−τH)
∂x˜
∂τF
. From (145b), the long-
run changes of real consumption, physical capital and employment fiscal tax reform following
a substitution of payroll taxes for income wage taxes are proportional to the steady-state
variations after a change in τF . While the directions of real expenditure in consumption
goods and labor supply are ambiguous, we have been able to state that overall capital stock
must rise after a fall in wage taxes paid by employers so that K˜ will be permanently increased
after the fiscal tax reform. Interestingly, the larger tax allowances κ, the stronger the long-run
stimulus of capital accumulation. This comes from the fact that a higher κ softens the fall
in the after-tax labor income and therefore the decrease in the marginal benefit of supplying
labor and consequently moderates the that impinges negatively on L˜. In addition, as κ gets
larger, the combined effect of a smaller drop of employment and a lower reduction of the after-
tax wage income w˜A moderates the wealth effect and therefore the decline in real expenditure
in consumption goods.
It is now convenient to explore the overall effect of the fiscal tax reform on public revenue.
First, while the fall in the tax rate paid by employers reduces the government revenues, they
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are raised by the increased income labor tax rate paid by households. Since the former is
levied on a relatively larger tax basis than the former, i. e. τH increased by a smaller amount
than the fall in τF , for given wage rate and employment, labor fiscal revenues decreased.
Second, the fiscal reform strategy makes households willing to spend a larger share of their
available time to work and to raise their consumption expenditure, public revenues from labor
taxes and VAT increase.
To estimate the overall effect of the fiscal reform strategy on public revenues, we differen-
tiate the balanced government budget constraint (113):
dZ = τ cpcdc˜
∣∣F,H + (w˜F − w˜A)dL˜∣∣F,H + {[w˜ + (τF + τH)wτF ]dτF + (w˜ − κ) dτH ∣∣F,H} L˜,
(146)
where the steady-changes in real consumption and labor supply lead to the following variation
in public revenues:
τ cpcdc˜
∣∣F,H + (w˜F − w˜A) dL˜∣∣F,H
= −σLL˜
∆
κΛ˜σc
{
pcc˜
[
(1 + τ c)− w˜
A
w˜F
]
+
r?
ν2
ω12
ν2
(
σcc˜
N − σLL˜k˜T ν2
)(
c˜NτA − pcc˜
w˜F
τ ck˜T ν2
)}
< 0.(147)
The sign of (147) follows from the fact that consumption and employment rise after a fall in
the payroll tax τF so that government earnings grow. In addition, we computed the last term
on the RHS of (113) which can be rewritten as follows:[
w˜ +
(
τF + τH
)
wτF
]
L˜dτF + (w˜ − κ) L˜dτH ∣∣F,H = κθL˜τF < 0. (148)
case kT > kN
If the traded sector is relatively more capital intensive than the non traded sector, the
long-run changes are given by:
dλ¯
∣∣F,H = λτHdτH ∣∣F,H + λτF dτF ,
=
dλ¯
dτF
κ
Λ˜
(
1− τH)
w˜A
dτF =
dλ¯
dτF
κ
w˜
dτF , (149a)
dx˜
∣∣F,H = ∂x˜
∂τH
dτH
∣∣F,H + ∂x˜
∂τF
dτF
=
∂x˜
∂τF
[
1− θ (w˜ − κ)
(
1 + τF
)
w˜ (1− τH)
]
dτF =
dx˜
dτF
κ
w˜
dτF , (149b)
(149c)
where x = c,K,L, b and we used the fact that ∂x˜
∂τH
=
(w˜−κ)(1+τF )
w˜(1−τH)
∂x˜
∂τF
. From (149b), the
long-run changes of real consumption, physical capital and employment fiscal tax reform
following a substitution of payroll taxes for income wage taxes are proportional to the steady-
state variations after a change in τF . Consequently, according to (100), the fiscal tax reform
unambiguously raises real consumption and labor supply, and stimulates capital accumulation
in the long-run.
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By substituting of long-run changes of real consumption and employment, we obtain:
dZ =
{
−σcpcc˜σLL˜Λ˜
∆
(
τ c + τA
)
+ κ
(
1− τH
1 + τF
)
L˜
}
dτF ,
=
σLw˜
(
1− τH) L˜
∆
w˜L˜
{
−σcpcc˜
w˜AL˜
(
τ c + τA
)
+
κ
w˜
(
σcpcc˜
σLw˜F L˜
+ 1
)}
dτF , (150)
The change in government revenues following the fiscal reform strategy is unclear. While the
substitution of labor income taxes for payroll taxes improve the earnings of the state by raising
real consumption (hence the fiscal basis of consumption taxes) together with labor (hence the
fiscal basis of labor taxes), the fall in government revenues due to the insufficient rise in the
labor income tax rate plays in opposite direction. The latter effect must predominate over
the former effect so that government revenues fall. The explanation is as follows. Since the
labor income tax rate must rise by an amount w˜w˜−κ
1−τH
1+τF
to maintain the government budget
constraint balanced, the increase in τH is not large enough for this condition to be fulfilled,
since the labor income tax rate rises by 1−τ
H
1+τF
which is smaller.
J Tax Multipliers
In this section, we derive analytical expressions of overall and sectoral tax multipliers.
J.1 Overall Tax Multipliers
Long-Run Tax Multiplier
Because overall output denoted by Y is the sum of traded output Y T and non traded
output measured in terms of the traded good pµY
N , using the fact that Y T ≡ Y T (K,L, p)
and Y N ≡ Y N (K,L, p), remembering that steady-state level of the real exchange rate is
unaffected by a tax restructuring, the steady-state change of overall output can be expressed
as:
dY˜
∣∣j,k = (Y TK + p˜µY NK
)
dK˜
∣∣j,k + (Y TL + p˜µY NL
)
dL˜
∣∣j,k,
= p˜r?dK˜
∣∣j,k + wFdL˜∣∣j,k > 0. (151)
where we use properties (57b) and (57c) to get (151).
Initial Tax Multiplier
Adopting a similar procedure keeping in mind that the capital stock is initially predeter-
mined, the short-run tax multiplier writes as follows:
dY (0)
∣∣j,k = (Y TL + pµY NL
)
dL(0)
∣∣j,k + (Yˆ Tp + pµYˆ Np
)
dp(0)
∣∣j,k,
= wFdL(0)
∣∣j,k > 0, (152)
where we use properties (57c) to get (152); according to property (57a), denoting by a hat
the partial derivative of Y w. r. t. p for given labor, Yˆ Tp +
p
µ Yˆ
N
p = 0;
61
J.2 Sectoral Tax Multipliers
Long-Run Sectoral Tax Multipliers
kN > kT
We calculate the tax multiplier in the traded sector by differentiating the short-run static
solution for Y T evaluated at the steady-state:
dY˜ T
∣∣j,k = Y TK dK˜∣∣j,k + Y TL dL˜∣∣j,k = Φj,k
[
Y TK
dK˜
dτ j
+ Y TL
dL˜
dτ j
]
dτF ,
=
ν1
ν2
σLL˜
∆
σcpcc˜Υj
{[
(1− αc) w˜F + r?p˜k˜N
]
+ αck˜Nr?
ω12
ν2
(
σcc˜
N − σLL˜kT ν2Λ˜
)}
Φdτ j > 0, j = F,H, (153)
where dτ j < 0 since we consider a fall in the labor income tax rate τ j , Φj,c =
pcc˜
χc
[
1− w˜AL˜pc(1+τc)c˜
]
> 0 (with j = F,H) as longer as a˜ > 0, and ΦF,H = w˜κ > 0. To determine
(153), we used the fact that Y TL = −p˜ν1k˜N > 0, Y TK = p˜ν1 < 0,
(
ν2k˜
T + ν1k˜N
)
= − w˜Fp˜ < 0
and ν1 + ν2 = r?.
We calculate the tax multiplier in the non traded sector by differentiating the short-run
static solution for Y N/µ evaluated at the steady-state:
p˜
µ
dY˜ N
∣∣j,k = p˜
µ
Y NK dK˜
∣∣j,k + p˜
µ
Y NL dL˜
∣∣j,k = Φj,k [Y NK dK˜dτ j + Y NLµ dL˜dτ j
]
dτ j ,
= −σLL˜
∆
σcc˜
NΥj
{
w˜F − k˜T r?ω
1
2
ν2
(
σcc˜
N − σLL˜kT ν2Λ˜
)}
Φdτ j > 0, (154)
where we used the fact that Y NK = µν2 > 0 and Y
N
L = −k˜Tµν2 < 0.
kT > kN
We calculate the tax multiplier in the traded sector by differentiating the short-run static
solution for Y T evaluated at the steady-state:
dY˜ T
∣∣j,k = Y TK dK˜∣∣j,c + Y TL dL˜∣∣j,c = Φj,k
[
Y TK
dK˜
dτ j
+ Y TL
dL˜
dτ j
]
dτF ,
=
ν2
ν1
σLL˜
∆
Υjσcpcc˜
[
(1− αc) w˜F + r?p˜k˜N
]
Φj,kdτ j > 0, j = F,H, (155)
where Υj > 0 and Φj,k > 0 (as longer as a˜ > 0. We used the fact that Y TL = −p˜ν2k˜N < 0,
Y TK = p˜ν2 > 0,
(
ν1k˜
T + ν2k˜N
)
= − w˜Fp˜ < 0 and ν1 + ν2 = r? to get (155).
We calculate the tax multiplier in the non traded sector by differentiating the short-run
static solution for Y N/µ evaluated at the steady-state:
p˜
µ
dY˜ N
∣∣j,k = p˜
µ
Y NK dK˜
∣∣j,k + p˜
µ
Y NL dL˜
∣∣j,k = Φj,k [Y NK
µ
dK˜
dτ j
+
Y NL
µ
dL˜
dτ j
]
dτ j ,
= −σLL˜
∆
Υjσcc˜N w˜FΦj,kdτ j > 0, j = F,H, (156)
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where we used the fact that Y NK = µν1 < 0 and Y
N
L = −k˜Tµν1 > 0 to get (156).
Short-Run Sectoral Tax Multipliers
kN > kT
Remembering that the short-run solution Y T ≡ Y T (K,L, p), using the fact that the capi-
tal stock is initially predetermined, dL(0)
∣∣j,k = dL˜∣∣j,k+Lpdp(0)∣∣j,k and dp(0)∣∣j,k = −ω12dK˜∣∣j,k,
the short-run tax multiplier is given by:
dY T (0)
∣∣j,k = Y TL dL(0)∣∣j,k + Yˆ Tp dp(0)∣∣j,k,
= −Φj,k
[
p˜ν1k˜
N dL˜
dτ j
+ Y Tp ω
1
2
dK˜
dτ j
]
dτ j ≷ 0, (157)
where we used the fact that Y TL = −p˜ν1k˜N > 0; we denoted by a hat the partial derivative of
Y T w. r. t. p for given labor, i. e. Yˆ Tp < 0, and we used the fact that Y
T
L Lp+ Yˆ
T
p = Y
T
p . The
short-run tax multiplier in the traded sector is the result of two conflictory forces: while the
initial stimulus of labor supply induces a labor inflow in the traded sector, the real exchange
appreciation shifts away resources from the traded sector towards the non traded sector.
Differentiating the short-run solution for Y N ≡ Y N (K,L, p) and remembering that the
capital stock is initially predetermined, the short-run tax multiplier is given by:
p
µ
dY N (0)
∣∣j,k = p
µ
Y NL dL(0)
∣∣j,k + p
µ
Yˆ Np dp(0)
∣∣j,k,
= −Φj,k
[
p˜ν1k˜
N dL˜
dτ j
+
Y Np
µ
ω12
dK˜
dτ j
]
dτ j ≷ 0, (158)
where we used the fact that Y NL = −k˜Tµν2 < 0, and we denoted by a hat the partial derivative
of Y N w. r. t. p for given labor, i. e. Yˆ Np > 0. The short-run tax multiplier in the non traded
sector is the result of two conflictory forces: while the initial stimulus of labor supply induces
a labor outflow from the non traded sector, the real exchange appreciation attracts resources
in the non traded sector.
kT > kN
Remembering that the short-run solution Y T ≡ Y T (K,L, p), using the fact that the capi-
tal stock is initially predetermined and the real exchange is unaffected by a tax restructuring,
the short-run tax multiplier is given by:
dY T (0)
∣∣j,k = Y TL dL(0)∣∣j,k = Y TL dL˜∣∣j,k < 0, (159)
where we used the fact that Y TL = −p˜ν2k˜N < 0,
Differentiating the short-run solution for Y N ≡ Y N (K,L, p) and remembering that the
capital stock is initially predetermined, the short-run tax multiplier is given by:
p
µ
dY N (0)
∣∣j,k = p
µ
Y NL dL(0)
∣∣j,k = p
µ
Y NL dL˜
∣∣j,k > 0, (160)
where we used the fact that Y NL = −k˜Tµν1 > 0.
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K Welfare Analysis
In this section, we investigate the welfare effects of an unanticipated of tax restructuring which
involves simultaneously cutting labor tax by dτ j < 0 (j = F,H) and raising the consumption
tax rate or the labor income tax rate by dτk > 0 (k = c,H). We denote by φ the instantaneous
welfare:
φ(t) = u (c(t)) + v (L(t)) , (161)
and by U its discounted value over an infinite horizon:
U =
∫ ∞
0
φ(t) exp (−δt) dt. (162)
K.1 Instantaneous Welfare
We first linearize the instantaneous utility function (161) in the neighborhood of the steady-
state:
φ(t) = φ˜+ uc (c˜) (c(t)− c˜) + vL(L˜)
(
L(t)− L˜
)
, (163)
with φ˜ given by
φ˜ = u (c˜) + v
(
L˜
)
. (164)
By substituting solutions for c(t) and L(t), we obtain the stable solution for instantaneous
welfare:
φ(t) = φ˜+ [uccp + vLLp]ω12
(
K0 − K˜
)
eν1t, (165)
where partial derivatives are evaluated at the steady-state, i. e. uc = uc (c˜) and vL = vL
(
L˜
)
.
We estimate the expression in square brackets by making use of the first-order conditions
for consumption and labor supply supply decisions evaluated at the steady-state, i. e. uc =
pcλ¯ (1 + τ c) and vL = −λ¯w˜A. We obtain:
uccp + vLLp = λ¯
−σcc˜N (1 + τ c) + w˜A
w˜F
σLL˜k˜
T Λ˜
h˜
µ
(
k˜N − k˜T
)
 ≷ 0. (166)
Evaluate (161) at the steady-state and differentiate, one obtains the long-run change of φ
after a tax restructuring:
dφ˜
∣∣j,k = Φj,k [uc dc˜dτ j dτ j + vL dL˜dτ j
]
dτ j ≷ 0, (167)
where 0 < Φj,k < 1.
Evaluate (165) at time t = 0 and differentiate, we get the initial reaction of φ after a tax
restructuring:
dφ(0)
∣∣j,k = dφ˜∣∣j,k − (uccp + vLLp)ω12dK˜∣∣j,k,
= Φj,k
{
uc
[
dc˜
dτ j
− cpω12
dK˜
dτ j
]
+ vL
[
dL˜
dτ j
− Lpω12
dK˜
dτ j
]}
dτ j , (168)
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where we used (167) to get (168).
Case kN > kT
If the non traded sector is more capital intensive than the traded sector, the long-run
change of φ after a tax restructuring writes as follows:
dφ˜
∣∣j,k = Φj,k{pcλ¯ (1 + τ c) [1− w˜A
w˜F
1
pc (1 + τ c)
]
dc˜
dτ j
dτ j
+ Γj λ¯
σLL˜
∆
w˜A
σcpcc˜
p˜
r?
ν2
ω12
ν2
(
σcc˜
N − σLL˜k˜T ν2Λ˜
)(
αc +
k˜T p˜ν2
w˜F
)}
dτ j ≷ 0, (169)
where 0 < Φj,k < 1 and Γj > 0. We substituted uc = pcλ¯ (1 + τ c) and vL = −λ¯w˜A, and we
used the fact that dL˜dτ j =
pc
w˜F
dc˜
dτ j − Γj
σLL˜
∆
r?
ν2
ω12
ν2
(
σcc˜
N − σLL˜k˜T ν2Λ˜
)
σcc˜
N to determine (169).
Since the sign of the long-run change of instantaneous welfare is not clear-cut, we dot not
calculate the initial reaction of φ which in particular depends on expression (169).
Case kT > kN
If the traded sector is more capital intensive than the non traded sector, the long-run
change of φ after a tax restructuring writes as follows:
dφ˜
∣∣j,k = Φj,kpcλ¯ (1 + τ c) [1− w˜A
w˜F
1
1 + τ c
]
dc˜
dτ j
dτ j > 0, (170)
where 0 < Φj,k < 1. We substituted uc = pcλ¯ (1 + τ c) and vL = −λ¯w˜A, and we used the fact
that dL˜dτ j =
pc
w˜F
dc˜
dτj to determine (170).
K.2 Overall Welfare
Until now, we have analyzed the instantaneous welfare implications of an unanticipated per-
manent fiscal expansion, say at different points of times. To address welfare effects in a
convenient way within an intertemporal-maximizing framework, we have to evaluate the dis-
counted value of (161) over the agent’s infinite planning horizon. Whereas the change of
overall welfare will be estimated numerically, we determine its measure along a transitional
path after a tax restructuring.
In order to have a correct and comprehensive measure of welfare, we calculate first the
discounted value of instantaneous welfare over the entire planning horizon:
U =
φ˜
δ
+
[uccp + vLLp]ω12
r? − ν1 A1
=
φ˜
δ
+
φ(0)− φ˜
r? − ν1 . (171)
The first term on the right hand-side of (171) represents the capitalized value of instantaneous
welfare evaluated at the steady-state. The second term on the RHS of (171) vanishes whenever
the traded sector is more capital intensive than the non traded sector since the dynamics of
the real exchange degenerate. If consumption reacts strongly on impact and labor is not too
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much responsive, then φ(0) can overshoot its long-run level which exerts a positive influence
on overall welfare.
Case kN > kT
If the non traded sector is more capital intensive than the traded sector, the long-run
change of φ after a tax restructuring writes as follows:
dU
∣∣j,k = 1
δ
dφ˜
∣∣j,k − [uccp + vLLp]ω12
r? − ν1 dK˜
∣∣j,k
=
1
r?ν2
Φj,k
{
uc
[
dc˜
dτ j
− r?cpω12
dK˜
dτ j
]
+ vL
[
dL˜
dτ j
− r?Lpω12
dK˜
dτ j
]}
dτ j ≷ 0, (172)
with
dc˜
dτ j
− r?cpω12
dK˜
dτ j
=
σLL˜
∆
σcc˜Υj
{
p˜ν1k˜
N
[
1 + αcσc
c˜N
p˜
r?
ν2
ω12
]
+ r?k˜T ν2ω12
[
σcc˜
Nαc − σLL˜k˜T Λ˜
]}
< 0, (173a)
dL˜
dτ j
− r?Lpω12
dK˜
dτ j
= −σLL˜
∆
σcc˜Υj
{
ν2
[
1 + αcσc
c˜N
p˜
r?
ν2
ω12
ν2
]
+
r?
ν2
ω12
p˜
σLL˜k˜
T Λ˜
[
αc (1− σc) + p˜ν2k˜
T
w˜F
]}
≶ 0. (173b)
Case kT > kN
If the traded sector is more capital intensive than the non traded sector, the long-run
change of φ after a tax restructuring writes as follows:
dU
∣∣j,k = 1
δ
dφ˜
∣∣j,k > 0, (174)
where dφ˜
∣∣j,k > 0 is given by (170).
L Imperfect Competition: Derivation of Price Index and Ag-
gregate Non Traded Consumption
The open economy consists of perfectly competitive firms producing a traded good and imper-
fectly competitive firms that each produces a single variety of a diversified good. These goods
are similar but imperfect substitutes in consumption. We assume that there is a continuum
of commodities indexed by the subscript j ∈ [0, n] and denoted by x(j), each produced by a
different firm. Since commodities are differentiated, each firm has market power and is able
to set a price over the marginal cost. Consumption of non traded commodity j is aggregated
by the means of the following formulation:
cN = n
1
1−σ
[∫ n
0
(x(j))
σ−1
σ
] σ
σ−1
, σ > 1, (175)
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where the size of the parameter σ reflects the ease with which any varieties can be substituted
for each other. The maximization problem writes as follows:
max
x(j)
cN = n
1
1−σ
[∫ n
0
(x(j))
σ−1
σ
] σ
σ−1
subject to EN =
∫ n
0
%(j)x(j)dj, (176)
where EN is any fixed nominal expenditure on non tradables. The first order conditions of
problem are the constraint of problem (176) together with(
x(j)
x(j′)
)− 1
σ
=
%(j)
%(j′)
or x(j) =
(
%(j)
%(j′)
)−σ
x(j′), (177)
where we consider two goods, j and j′.
Consider now the aggregate price index p corresponding to the real consumption index
(175) defined as the minimum expenditure required to purchase one unit of real aggregate
consumption cN = 1:
p = min
x(j)
EN = min
x(j)
∫ n
0
%(j)x(j)dj subject to cN = n
1
1−σ
[∫ n
0
(x(j))
σ−1
σ
] σ
σ−1
= 1. (178)
Substitution of (177) into (175) and expression of EN , by keeping in mind that cN =
n
1
1−σ
[∫ n
0 (x(j))
σ−1
σ
] σ
σ−1 = 1 implies that n−
1
σ
∫ n
0 (x(j))
σ−1
σ = 1 leads to:
EN =
x(j′)
%(j′)−σ
∫ n
0
%(j)1−σdj, (179a)
1 = n−
1
σ
c(j′)
σ−1
σ
p(j′)1−σ
∫ n
0
%(j)1−σdj, (179b)
Dividing the first expression by the second gives:
EN =
[
nx(j′)
%(j′)−σ
] 1
σ
(180)
Substituting (180) into equation (179a), we obtain:(
EN
)1−σ
= n−1
∫ n
0
%(j)1−σdj. (181)
By the definition of the price index, the unit cost of the non traded composite good writes as
follows:
p = n−
1
1−σ
[∫ n
0
(p(j))1−σ
] 1
1−σ
. (182)
Using (179a) and (182), we obtain:
x(j)′
%(j′)−σ
= EN (p)σ−1 n−1. (183)
Substituting (183) into the second equality of (177), we obtain the demand for variety j
of the non traded consumption good:
x(j) =
1
n
(
%(j)
p
)−σ
cN , (184)
where we used the fact that EN/p = cN with cN the composite non traded consumption good.
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M Data and Estimation Methodology
The calibration of output shares of capital income (θT , θN ) and markups (µT , µN ) are based
on the EU KLEMS sectoral database, comprising 11 industries and 13 countries over the
period 1970-2004.3 Following De Gregorio, Giovannini and Wolf [1994], Agriculture, Hunting,
Forestry and Fishing; Mining and Quarrying; Total Manufacturing; Transport and Storage;
and Communication are classified as traded goods with weights given by relative nominal
value added within the sector. Electricity, Gas and Water Supply; Construction; Wholesale
and Retail Trade; Hotels and Restaurants; Finance, Insurance, Real Estate and Business
Services; and Community Social and Personal Services industries account for the non traded
sector. The dataset enables construction of aggregate data on traded and non traded output,
capital stock and employment. Sectoral ratios Y N/Y and LN/L immediately follow.
Markups are estimated at the industry level for each country and are aggregated as follows
to construct µT and µN :
µT =
4∑
j=1
ωjT µˆj µ
N =
6∑
j=1
ωjN µˆj , (185)
where ωjT (resp. ωjN ) is the nominal value added-weight of industry j in sector T (resp.
N). The estimates µˆj are obtained applying the consistent methodology developed by Roeger
[1995]. This approach takes account of labor, capital and intermediate inputs as production
factors and the specific variables required to apply the Roeger’s method are the following:
gross output (at basic current prices), compensation of employees, intermediate inputs at
current purchasers prices, and capital services (volume) indices. The testable equation of the
Roeger’s methodology may be written as:
yj,t = βj xj,t + εj,t, (186)
with yt = ∆(pj,tYj,t)−αN,t∆(wj,tLj,t)−αM,t∆(mj,tMj,t)−(1− αN,t − αM,t)∆ (rtKj,t), xj,t =
∆(pj,tYj,t)−∆(rtKj,t), and εj,t the i.i.d. error term. ∆ (pj,tYj,t) denotes the nominal output
growth in industry j, ∆ (wj,tLj,t) the nominal labor cost growth, ∆ (mj,tMj,t) the growth
in nominal intermediate input costs and ∆ (rtKj,t) the nominal capital cost growth. All
these variables are compiled from the EU KLEMS database except the user cost of capital
rt. No sector-specific information was available to construct rt, so the rental price of capital
is calculated as rt(≡ rj,t) = pI (i− piGDP + δK), with pI is the deflator for business non
residential investment, i the long-term nominal interest rate, piGDP the GDP deflator based
inflation rate and the depreciation rate is fixed at 5% throughout (pI , i and piGDP were
taken from OECD database). An econometric issue faced when estimating (186) with the
OLS is the potential endogeneity of the regressor associated with the heteroskedasticity and
autocorrelation of the error term. To tackle these problems, we estimate (186) by using
heteroskedastic and autocorrelation consistent standard errors as suggested by Newey and
West [1993] (lag truncation =2). Finally, the markup estimate µˆj is equal to 1/(1− βˆj).4
3Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Spain, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Sweden, the
United Kingdom (UK) and the United States (US).
4Countries estimates for each µˆj , j = 1, ..., 11, are not reported here to save space, but are available upon
request.
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Sectoral government expenditure data over the period 1978-2004 were obtained from
the Government Finance Statistics Yearbook and OECD database. Following Morshed and
Turnovsky [2004], the following four sectors were treated as traded: Fuel and Energy; Agricul-
ture, Forestry, Fishing, and Hunting; Mining, Manufacturing, and Construction; Transport
and Communications. The following sectors were treated as being non traded: Government
Public Services; Defense; Public Order and Safety; Education; Health; Social Security and
Welfare; Housing and Community Amenities; Recreation Cultural and Community Affairs.
Disaggregation of gross fixed capital formation in OECD countries distinguishes between
five types of investment inputs. Products of Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing and Aquacul-
ture; Metal Products and machinery; and Transport Equipment are defined as traded inputs.
Housing; and Other Buildings are treated as non traded investment goods (source: OECD
Input-Output database).
Payroll tax rate, labor income tax rate, and the consumption tax rate are specified as
effective tax rates and are computed according to the following formulas:
τF =
Taxes on payroll and workforce + Employers’ contribution to social security
Compensation of employees
,
τH = Income tax (average rate) + Employees’ social security contributions (average rate),
τ c =
Taxes on production, sale, transfer
Final consumption expenditure of households and general government
.
Tax allowances, κ, is calculated as the share of taxable income into the gross wage earnings
before taxes. All taxes and incomes data were taken from OECD database.
Finally, data for private consumption, government and investment expenditure, as well
those for GDP were drawn from the OECD ”National Accounts of OECD Countries” database.
Table (9) summarizes the values of the non tradable share in overall GDP, total employ-
ment, public spending, and sectoral output shares of capital income, and, markups.
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Table 9: Ratios for Countries
Y N
Y
LN
L
IN
I
gN
Y N
gT
Y T
c
Y
g
Y
I
Y
θT θN µ
Austria 0.65 0.60 0.59 0.28 0.07 0.55 0.20 0.24 0.28 0.32 1.52
Belgium 0.67 0.65 n.a. 0.30 0.09 0.54 0.24 0.22 0.33 0.35 1.39
Denmark 0.70 0.67 0.58 0.40 0.07 0.52 0.29 0.21 0.32 0.32 1.52
Spain 0.61 0.59 0.64 0.25 0.05 0.61 0.16 0.24 0.41 0.33 1.37
Finland 0.58 0.57 0.63 0.34 0.09 0.51 0.23 0.25 0.35 0.26 1.41
France 0.69 0.64 0.63 0.33 0.06 0.56 0.24 0.21 0.27 0.30 1.42
Germany 0.64 0.61 0.61 0.30 0.06 0.57 0.22 0.23 0.22 0.35 1.55
Italy 0.63 0.56 0.54 0.29 0.06 0.58 0.20 0.23 0.22 0.33 1.73
Japan 0.64 0.61 0.59 n.a. n.a. 0.53 0.14 0.30 0.42 0.39 1.63
Netherlands 0.67 0.69 0.63 0.34 0.08 0.50 0.25 0.22 0.37 0.29 1.36
Sweden 0.65 0.67 0.47 0.43 0.09 0.49 0.31 0.20 0.30 0.30 1.44
UK 0.62 0.66 0.52 0.33 0.05 0.60 0.23 0.19 0.30 0.28 1.47
US 0.68 0.72 0.59 0.22 0.06 0.66 0.17 0.19 0.36 0.32 1.42
Total average 0.65 0.63 0.59 0.32 0.07 0.56 0.22 0.23 0.32 0.32 1.48
kT > kN 0.64 0.64 0.60 0.30 0.07 0.57 0.20 0.23 0.37 0.31 1.44
kN > kT 0.66 0.63 0.57 0.33 0.07 0.55 0.24 0.22 0.28 0.33 1.51
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